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NOTES
Webb-Pomerene vs. Foreign Economic Policy
Generations before Mitchell effectively forestalled the enterprising Mr.
Reynolds,' Anglo-Saxon common law had assumed free competition as the
presumptive economic ideal.2 Although the first inducement to such a
position was political jealousy of royal prerogatives, natural philosophers
were not long in adducing economic principles to justify this policy scien-
tifically and to shape it for use in the courts.4 Under pure competition each
individual would be free to utilize his resources and energies to the pro-
duction of anything he pleased and would be able to trade his production
for whatever he wished.5 Restraints on competition would narrow the
choice of the individual as a producer and deprive him of the benefits of
the lowest possible prices as a consumer. Competition restraints would
transfer control of resource allocation from the individual, and of prices
from the totality of individuals to the hands of monopoly management.
This policy, however, found legal expression in a negative manner only.
The courts in England and later in America merely refused to enforce
restrictive agreements.
In 1890 the Congress of the United States, awed at the prodigious
fortunes monopoly profits had amassed and mindful of the economic in-
equalities that perpetuated them, decided to give a positive federal remedy
at the suit of those harmed by restrictive trade practices or at the suit or on
the indictment of the Federal Government itself. The product of this de-
cision was the Sherman Act, which rendered combinations, contracts or
conspiracies in restraint of trade illegal and which made monopolization or
the attempt to monopolize a misdemeanor.6
It was felt, however, that as far as export sales went, enforcement of
the Sherman Act resulted in a gratuitous bounty to citizens of other nations
in the form of depressed prices as a result of competition. The corollary
was lower profits for American industrialists.7 During World War I,
before the United States had assumed domination of world trade, this senti-
ment was reinforced by the expressions of grievances by American pro-
ducers that enforced competition among Americans in the arena of world
1. Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Williams 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
2. Cf. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 JAS. I, c. 3.
3. See KNAPPEI, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 357 (1942).
4. Locke and Hume popularized the idea and Adam Smith gave it its most
concise statement in WEALTH or NATIONS 61 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
5. BOWMAN AND BACH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 140 (1946).
6. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1948).
7. Pres. Wilson's inaugural address, Dec. 5, 1916. Relevant excerpts are printed
in Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Study of Motwpoly Power on H.R.
5041, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 112 (1950). Hereinafter cited as the 1950 Hearings.
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trade where foreign cartels had long held sway was an intolerable handicap.'
Congress felt that something should be done about the matter and passed
the problem to the Federal Trade Commission.
In the act which created the Federal Trade Commission, Congress in-
cluded a provision that the new agency inquire into trade conditions in and
with foreign countries which might affect the foreign trade of this country.9
Hearings were held in sixteen cities throughout the country and, with the
cooperation of the State Department, in the cities of many foreign
countries."0 The findings of these investigations were published by the
FTC in a two volume report which contained recommendations for legisla-
tion to remove the evils that the commission thought demanded correction."
First, the FTC pointed out the value of increased foreign trade, not
only to increase the general volume of commerce, but to help smooth out
seasonal demands and local cyclical depressions.' 2 Second, it pointed out
that American foreign trade was very small in proportion to its domestic
trade and to the foreign trade of other nations, notably England and
Germany. Next, the FTC attempted to indicate the cause of the disparity,
and laid the blame on the Sherman Act. Probable or potential prosecution
under that act had inhibited combination of American producers for export.
Without such combination they were powerless to compete effectively with
foreign seller cartels and were forced to bargain individually with foreign
buyer cartels. The FTC also expressed concern for the small businessman
who naturally could not compete with the foreigners or even with his big
American brothers since he could not afford the cost of foreign distributors,
freight, or insurance on his small volume shipments. American export
houses were inadequate to promote the sales of the small business abroad,
especially when the commodities produced were novel or had small volume
demand.13
8. See the Resolution of the National Foreign Trade Convention, Jan. 27, 1917,
printed in 1950 Hearings at 112. And see FTC REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERI-
CAN EXPORT TRADE. 373 (1916). Hereinafter cited as the 1916 REPoRT.
9. §6(h) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
10. Love, The Export Trade Act, 8 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 608 (1940). Miss
Love was chief of the Export Trade Section of the FTC at this time.
11. 1916 REPORT.
12. 1916 REPORT, vol. 1, pp. 23, 24. These and other findings and the recom-
mendations of the 1916 REPORT can be found. Export Prices and Export Cartels,
Webb-Pomerene Associations 113-118 (TNEC Monograph 6, 1940). (Hereinafter
cited as TNEC Mono. 6). An excellent summary of the entire 1916 REPORT can be
found in REPORT OF THE FOREIGN TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF AMERIcAN SMALL BUSINESS 50 (1946). (Hereinafter cited
as 1946 REPORT).
13. A distinguished American economist long ago pointed out fallacies underlying
many of the FTC's conclusions in this report, Fournier, The Webb-Pornerene Act,
22 Am. EcoN. REv. 18 (1932). Producer cartels are, in his view, only formed to get
better than competitive profits (or for dumping, an entirely irrelevant question) and
Americans should be able to undersell them. Export houses could garner many of the
savings that would be gained from cooperation which they in turn could pass on to
small business. Novel lines of commodities would by their own merit bear much
of the added cost without the lessening of demand. Instead of FTC's narrow theory
he suggested that foreign trade is ultimately determined solely by the comparative
advantage principles and that, when the time for profitable export came, American
ingenuity would override the petty temporary barriers of foreign cartels.
The FTC's theory, when applied to its findings, resulted in an endorse-
ment of American export cooperation.14 Such cooperation would enable
American exporters to compete in foreign markets on more nearly equal
terms and would save the small businessman from economic provincialism.
The Sherman Act itself probably did not prohibit cooperation for such a
purpose provided the cooperation did not restrain domestic trade and did
not restrict American exporters. 15 An act expressing this limited exemp-
tion in terms was suggested. As a safeguard it was proposed that the type
of organization which was to effectuate such cooperation be specifically
described in the statute and confined to purely export businesses. Produc-
tion could not be combined, since this would unavoidably affect domestic
trade. Thus the organizations were to be limited to the selling function.
The danger that these organizations might easily become offenders of the
Sherman Act would be allayed by making them subject to registration and
review by the FTC.
Following up this report, Senator Pomerene and Congressman Webb
introduced bills along the lines of these recommendations which were to
remain in the legislative wringer for two years and to emerge finally as
the Export Trade of 1918.
THE AcT
The task of carving a limited exemption from the comprehensive body
of economic regulation naturally resulted in a statute replete with provisos
and definitions. The primary object of lifting Sherman Act bans also
involved companion modifications of the Clayton and FTC Acts. The
supervisory function of the FTC had to be detailed to complete the process.
The net result was a clumsy, verbose product.
The basic definitions of the Webb-Pomerene Act are routine. "Export
trade" is defined to include solely trade in merchandise exported or in the
course of export but explicitly to exclude production within the United
States. "Association" is defined as any combination of persons, partner-
ships or corporations.' 6
Marking the extent of the dispensation from the Sherman Act proved
unwieldy. The Webb Act excludes any association created solely for the
purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in such
trade' Acts or agreements of the association share the exemption to the
extent they are not in restraint of trade in the United States or in restraint
of the export trade of a domestic competitor of the association. To all this
there is the proviso that an association may not do anything which arti-
ficially or intentionally affects prices in the United States of commodities in
the same general class with those that the association exports. Nor may
it do anything which substantially lessens competition in any manner in the
United States.
17
14. 1916 REPoRT, vol. 1, pp. 379-381.
15. This opinion of the FTC is expressed in the 1916 RFPORT. TNEC Mono.
6, p. 117.
16. 40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1948).
17. Id., § 62.
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The Clayton Act had to be opened, of course, to allow any corporation
to own or acquire stock in a corporation which would qualify as an export
association. But there remained the prohibition of such ownership where
its effect may be to substantially lessen domestic competition.' 8
While the Sherman and Clayton Acts were restricted by this statute,
the FTC Act was broadened. Its prohibition of unfair methods of com-
petition was extended to embrace unfair methods in export trade competi-
tion whether in America or abroad. 19
Finally the FTC was appointed watch-dog over these associations.
All associations formed under the Webb Act must file with the FTC in-
formation concerning the location of its places of business, the names and
addresses of its officers, the names and addresses of its members, and a copy
of its articles of incorporation and by-laws or its contract of association.
These files are revised annually and the Commission is informed, on re-
quest, as to the association's organization, business, conduct, practices,
management, and relations with other associations, corporations and indi-
viduals. If the FTC is given reason to believe that any association or any
act done by an association has exceeded the provisos limiting its activities,
it is directed to hold hearings to investigate the alleged violations. If the
investigation shows violations, the Commission must recommend a course
for the association which will keep it within the law. If the recommenda-
tions are not complied with, the FTC refers its findings and recom-
mendations to the Attorney General who may take discretionary action
thereupon.
2 0
Notwithstanding the conformity of this legislation with the recom-
mendations of the FTC's report the act did not have unanimous approval
and the debates in Congress indicate that a good deal of anxiety was en-
gendered by its provisions.21 The proponents of the bill had to give the
Congress frequent reassurance as to the object of the legislation. Senator
Pomerene stated that its purpose was to enable American businessmen to
stand on an equal footing with foreign competitors in the world market and
that it would be especially helpful to the proprietors of small businesses.
22
Congressman Webb made known that no big corporations were pushing the
bill but that it was desired by small businessmen who needed it. 2 It was
contemplated that enactment would enable the small businessman to com-
pete with foreign cartels and with large American firms possessing ex-
18. Id., §63.
19. Id., § 64.
20. Id., §65.
21. See debates: 64th Cong., June, Aug., and Sept., 1916; 65th Cong., May, June,
Sept., and Dec., 1917; Jan. and April, 1918; 53-56 CONG. REc. (1916-1918) passim;
Hearings Before House Committee on Judicary on H.R. 16707, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1916) ; Hearings Before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 17350,
64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917) ; H. R. REP. No. 1118, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916);
SEN. RP. No. 1056, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917); Sen. REP. No. 9, 65th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1917); H. R. REP. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917); SEN. RP. No.
109, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., (1917).
22. 56 CONG. Rac. 181 (1917).
23. 55 CONG. REc. 3569 (1916).
tensive foreign sales organizations by permitting cost savings through
pooled sales, financial stamina through pooled resources, and increased
bargaining power through price agreements. 24
Objections were raised that the act in practice would be contradictory,
that no association could operate within the safeguards that limited its
operations.2 5  Senator Cummins insisted that it would be impossible for
producing management to mentally divorce the activities of the association
with regard to export sales from domestic sales policy making.2 6 Congress-
man Morgan maintained that any export price control would unavoidably
affect domestic prices. 27  (At this point and elsewhere in the debates it is
probable that Congress had the practice of dumping in mind.) In fact,
Congressman Volstead said that the provisions of the bill were so contra-
dictory that it would be impossible to prove a violation under it, that courts
could not be expected to punish the natural effect of the elimination of
competition in a foreign market by an association expressly authorized by
Congress to do so. 28  In reply Congressman Webb reiterated his stand
that no restraint would be allowed upon competing American exporters by
stating that he envisioned scores of American associations competing in the
same general class of business.
2 9
Some question arose as to whether the associations had to be actual
selling agencies or whether they could merely act as clearing agencies for
the price-fixing and quota allocation of independent sellers. It was stated
that the latter was not the act's intent and that such an association would
tend towards becoming a cloak under which restraints could be protected
from the Sherman Act.30
However, the principal problem was the relationship of the associations
with cartels of international enterprises. It was made clear that no foreign
corporation could join an association,31 and that no combination of an
association with international cartels would be made lawful by the act.
32
It was agreed that such practices were and would be forbidden under the
Sherman Act whether the Agreement was made here or elsewhere.33
Indeed, so many problems were envisioned that Senator Cummins
came forth with a substitute bill which he said would gain all the benefits
desired but avoid all the possible dangers to competition which he con-
sidered the real reasons for industry's support of the bill.3 4 His bill author-
ized the creation of foreign selling agencies which were to be limited to
• 24. 1946 REPORT at 3; Berge, Anti-Trust Enforcement in the War and Post-
War Period, 12 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 371, 388 (1944).
25. 56 CONG. REc. 175 (1917).
26. Ibid.
27. 55 CONG. REc. 3573 (1916).
28. 56 CONG. REc. 4723 (1917).
29. 53 CONG. RE:c. 13537 (1916).
30. Fournier, supra note 13, at 29; 56 CONG. REC. 169, 4724 (1918).
31. 56 CONG. Rc. 169 (1917).
32. 56 Cong. Rec. 172 (1917).
33. Id. at 170.
34. Id. at 175.
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the function of distributors for all or any American made goods.85 How-
ever, his idea was overridden and the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act
was approved on April 10th, 1918. The FTC then set up an Export Trade
Division to handle the authority assigned to it and associations were formed
and carried on business.
80
THE AssocTATIoN
For the first few years all of the Webb associations (as they came to
be called) operated as joint sales agencies for the export trade of their
members. However, in 1924 the FTC published its "Silver Letter" 7 and
two other types of associations came into fashion. In one the association
buys the members' products and sells them for its own account abroad. In
the other and increasingly popular form, the association merely directs
exportation by members who actually carry it on through their own sales
organizations, such direction taking the form of price-fixing, quota alloca-
tion, etc.3
8
Usually associations are formed by producers of the same class of
commodities; in fact, miscellaneous products associations have not lasted
long in operation. 9 Generally the association handles only members'
products but in order to fill out a line of merchandise they occasionally buy
products of non-members in the United States to sell abroad.40 Most of
the groups have been formed for permanent use but some have been or-
ganized to dispose of a particular surplus or to meet some temporary con-
dition in a foreign market. Expenses and profits of the associations are
generally pro-rated to the shipments of the members, and whatever alloca-
tion for quota is necessary is usually done on the basis of previous exports
or production surplus probably available.
41
Since many of the associations formed on a permanent basis were dis-
solved, it should be helpful before examination of the practical functioning
of these groups to investigate the causes of these dissolutions. 42 Some
associations closed when theretofore slack domestic consumption picked up
and no surplus was available for export. Others simmered away when
35. This is commented upon in Fournier, supra note 13, at 31.
36. TNEC Mono. 6 at 123.
37. TNEC Mono. 6 at 125. It was written by the Commission, two Commis-
sioners dissenting, in reply to questions submitted by a group of businessmen in-
quiring as to the legality of a proposed association in the silver industry. In it the
opinion was expressed that an association could operate under the Webb Act even
if its only activities were price-fixing and order allocation for its members. Along
with this, the Commission stated that it found nothing illegal about an association
joining an international cartel if American domestic trade wasn't restrained. This
latter position has since been over-ridden by the courts, see note 61 infra.
38. TNEC Mono. 6 at 136.
39. 1946 REPORT at 58. See especially the history of the Namusa association.
40. TNEC Mono. 6 at 137.
41. Love, supra note 10, at 65. Generally prices are fixed by the association, this
requires allocation of orders and other concomitants.
42. TNEC Mono. 6 at 145; Diamond, Webb-Ponerene Act and Export Trade
Associations, 44 Col L. REv. 815, 816 (1944) ; 1946 REPORT at 58.
members found that they could not compete with the low prices on foreign-
produced goods, or happily discerned that after markets had been opened
for the goods, the association was no longer of much value. However,
most of the failures were caused by the attempts of foreign countries to gain
self-sufficiency or to put their own industry back on its feet after the great
depression. Blocked currency, the dollar shortage, import quotas, tariffs
and subsidies rendered trade impossible or unprofitable.
Many functions have been assumed by these organizations :43 acting as
an export sales agent; employing or directing the export sales agents of
members; establishing terms and policies of sale, together with uniform
contract forms; allocating export business; price fixing; buying for resale;
product standardization, including tailoring of the grade or style of the
product for foreign tastes or pocketbooks; arranging group-insurance, cargo
space and freight rates; collecting trade information; storing members'
products here or abroad to avoid market glutting; mass liquidating of, or
bartering for, blocked foreign currency; credit investigation; representation
for claims of customers; promotion of trade conferences and agreements;
and joint representation before foreign governments on legislation effecting
the association's trade. The association may perform all or only a few of
these functions.
Up to 1950, 152 associations had been formed under the Webb Act,
with a combined membership of over 2,500 mills and mines. However, the
turnover had been large, and the annual reports of the FTC show that the
number of operating associations varied from 40 in 1919 to 57 in 1929-30-31,
while the number of members in an association has varied from 1 to 277.
In 1950 there were 43 registered associations representing nearly 500
member companies.
44
Success of an association does not seem to depend on the number of
members; but, despite the inadequacy of records, some characteristics
emerge as those generally determinant of its longevity. The breadth of the
control over the exporting of the commodity class by the members seems
to be the pivotal factor. When no more than four companies account for a
very large part of American production, an association including these com-
panies has a good chance of succeeding. The Department of Justice has
found that wherever an association is successful, the industry represented
has had a history of anti-trust activity and has shown monopoly symptoms,
such as patent control, market sharing, or delivered-price systems. It is
also true, if this is an independent factor, that the successfully organized
markets were those of commodities of a standard quality.45
The value of the exports of these associations has varied from $91
million in 1921 to $724 million in 1929. However, no general rise and fall
pattern is indicated. The years 1929 and 1930 were extraordinary and
most of this volume is attributable to the petroleum association which was
43. 1946 REPORT at 56; TNEC Mono. 6 at 138, Diamond, supra note 45, at 815.
44. Love, supra note 10, at 612, and FTC Annual Reports to date.
45. 1946 PEPORT at 63; Diamond, supra note 42, at 817.
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in operation during those years. On the average, Webb associations have
accounted for only 7% of total United States exports but in 1929 that per-
centage was 14; in 1930, 17.5; and in 1931, 13.1.46 The FTC interprets
these statistics to show what a boon Webb associations were to American
industry in a time of world depression; 47 the Department of Justice con-
siders that this rise was mostly attributable to the formation of the petroleum
association; 48 and at least two economists consider that this period was
merely the apex of a sharp upswing begun in 1924 as a consequence of the
publication of the "Silver Letter." 49
Since World War II the value of Webb exports swung sharply up-
ward, reached a peak and receded, as did American exports generally.
However, the contraction in Webb exports may also be traceable to vigorous
enforcement of the Webb provisos and of the anti-trust acts. The following
table summarizes the absolute and relative value of these exports during
the post-war period 50 (in thousands of dollars) :
1946 1947 1948 1949
Total U. S. Exports 9,700,000 14,400,000 12,650,000 12,000,000
Total Webb Exports 322,600 1,084,000 700,200 623,000
Percent of Total 3.33 7.64 5.61 5.17
As indicated above, the FTC was given supervisory duties over these
associations. However, the job was given to a division of export trade
within the FTC, the total of whose expenditures did not reach $9,000
dollars a year until 1945. At that point, investigations of these companies
by the Justice Department spurred the Commission to increase its outlay
to over $65,000 and since then comparable attention has been paid to this
division.51 The inadequacy of the policing job was pointed out clearly in
the general findings of the Temporary National Economic Committee, and
especially in that body's investigations of the copper 8 2 and steel 53 cartels.
Gross violations of the act were found to exist, flagrantly open to FTC
notice.
CASE DEVELOPMENTS
The question whether associations formed under the Webb-Pomerene
Act were subject to prosecution by the Department of Justice under the
anti-trust laws has only recently been settled. The view of the FTC, with
46. 1946 REPORT at 60, and see the FTC Annual Reports from 1919 to date and
compare U.S. Statistical Abstracts for corresponding years.
47. 1946 REPORT at 10.
48. Id. at 61.
49. Notz, Economics of Export Trade Associations, 19 Am. EcoN. REv. 16
(1929) ; Fournier, supra note 13, at 24.
50. See Annual Reports of the FTC and the U.S. Statistical Abstracts for these
years.
51. See Annual Reports of the FTC for these years.
52. TNEC, HEARINGS ON INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF EcoNomic POWER,
p. 25, pp. 13125-13135 (1939). Hereinafter TNEC HEARINGS.
53. TNEC HEARINGS, p. 20, pp. 10922-109558 (1939).
support in the wording of the act, was that it had to refer cases to the De-
partment before the associations could be piosecuted. But in 1948, the
Supreme Court decided that prosecution was within the power of the
Justice Department without specific direction by the FTC.54
That decision was given in an action instituted in 1944. Up to that
time, there had been only one investigation of the activities of a Webb
association and the only other proceedings involving the act was in a state
court. r5 Since 1944, eight FTC decisions and three federal court adjudica-
tions have provided some interpretation of the act.
Certainly the act gives some protection from the anti-trust laws to the
organizations authorized by it. The extent of that dispensation has been
the principal problem. An outstanding analysis of the act by an economist
has suggested that the only permissible restraint granted is between Amer-
icans producing and selling for export.56 That is, American law will not
force competition between Americans selling for export. Any other re-
straint engaged in by the same producers or by the association itself is still
within the ban on combination.
Specifically, the act provides that no activity will be engaged in which
restrains commerce suithin the United States, which restrains the trade of
any competing American exporter, or which artificially or intentionally
affects the domestic price on the article exported. These limitations restrict
further the relaxation of the competitive standard allowed to these asso-
ciations.
Under the act it seems that the combinations can grow to any size, and
include in the extreme all the producers in an industry 7 They can fix
prices for the goods exported and allocate the orders in foreign markets
among the members.58 However, they can not agree with any individual
or group of foreign producers or merchandisers to fix prices, set quotas or
allocate markets. 59 It is also unlawful for any foreign agent to become a
member of a Webb combine, 60 and no Webb group can own a foreign
producer or sales agency of foreign producers."' No association may work
together with foreign subsidiaries owned by the members to shift orders
54. U.S. Alkali Ass'n. v. United States, 323 U.S. 196 (1948).
55. American Export Door Corp. v. Gauger, 154 Wash. 514 (1929). Here the
court decided that an association's contract with its members forbidding sales to
other exporters was invalid since it violated the anti-trust provision of the state con-
stitution.
56. Fournier, mipra note 13.
57. United States v. Minnesota M. & M. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 947, 965 (1950).
58. Ibid.
59. United States v. U. S. Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (1949). But this
has been a prevalent practice of these associations. In 1945 the FTC found that 16
of the 49 associations registered at that time had cartel contracts with foreign associa-
tions. 1946 REPORT at 32. Today however, the FTC knows of no cartel agreements
joined in by an association, 1950 Hearings at 139.
60. See the "Silver Letter," supra note 37, and Phosphate Export Ass'n, 42
F.T.C. 555 (1946).
61. General Milk Co., Dckt. No. 202-7, Sept. 10, 1947, FTC ANN. REP. 85
(1948); Export Screw Ass'n, Dckt. No. 202-8, Feb. 19, 1947, FTC Ann. Rep. 84
(1948).
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to the overseas plants to gain higher profits than American export could
bring.62  No association can affect American prices by buying up and
selling abroad any domestic "excess" supply of the commodity usually
exported. 63
The members of the association may not be forced to restrict the resale
of their products to non-exporters. 64 Nor may the association set the
terms for sale by members to other American exporters.65 No association
may restrict the export of a non-member." Finally, a ban has been placed
on selling for non-members.
67
It seems that certain practices will not be prohibited unless they are
shown to be unreasonable. Within that limit an association may sell at a
price differential to American exporters, 68 establish exclusive dealerships
with foreign distributors,6 9 and fix the resale price for those distributors.70
If, under all the circumstances, no unreasonable restraint is shown, the
association may contract with its members to be their sole export agent and
may bind them for a reasonable time to continue membership and to restrict
their competitive exporting after withdrawal. 7'
These decisions are sparse and leave many questions unanswered, but
even these few show the difficulties which the vague standards given in the
act present to any body ruling on a specific case under the act.
FomEIGN EcoNoMIc POLICY
The theory of the act itself has been challenged.72 It is admitted that
certainly it is an exception to fundamental American economic policy and
represents a concession to attitudes of foreign legal systems which have
been described as injurious to the well being of all. Of course, while the
world remains departmentalized, we cannot force our theories upon other
nations. But our government finds itself now in a relationship to the rest
of the world vastly different from that existing at the time of the Webb
Act seemed a feasible defense for our tentative adventures into world
markets. Our military successes, potential military strength and vast
62. United States v. Minnesota M. & M. Co., 92 Fed. Supp. 947 (1950).
63. United States v. Alkali Exp. Ass'n, 86 Fed. Supp. 59, 75 (1949).
64. Ibid.
65. Pacific Coast Industries Ass'n, TNEC Mono. 6 at 130.
66. Sulphur Export Corp., Dckt. No. 202-6, Feb. 7, 1947, FTC ANN. REP.
83 (1947).
67. Phosphate Export Assn, 42 F.T.C. 555 (1946).
68. United States v. Minnesota M. & M. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (1950). This
ruling is necessary since the Robinson-Patman Act does not cover purchases for re-
sale overseas. Cf. 49 STAT. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 2a (1948).
69. United States v. Minnesota M. & M. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (1950). Legis-
lation has been proposed by Representative Multer to prohibit such exclusive dealer-
ships, H.R. 5041, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Hearings on this Bill are the subject
of the 1950 Hearings.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. See, generally, 1950 Hearings and STOCKING AND WATKINS, CARTELS OR
CoMP'TTIOrN? (1948).
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economic resources have placed us in the position of world leadership.
Our example, our counseling, and restrictions on our bounties allow us to
influence the world to an extent beyond contemplation in 1918.
The first steps have already been taken along the road to internation-
alization of trade regulation 73 and the way seems open to us to supplement
unilateral pressure towards free world trade by direct activity within in-
strumentalities of the United Nations.
But even where we are not successful in extending the mandate of
free competition we can rely on our tremendous advantage in economic
power to oppose foreign cartels without allowing combination among our-
selves. Pleas by American businessmen similar to those which resulted in
the Webb Act have recently fallen upon insensitive ears.
Chosen Instrument Theory. The Webb law permits combinations by
Americans in the selling of goods outside U.S. territory. A similar dis-
pensation has been urged by American businessmen in the field of inter-
national air travel. Until 1940 Pan American Airways, Inc., was the only
American air carrier possessing a certificate of convenience and necessity
issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board for air service over the North
Atlantic Ocean. At that time, the American Export Airlines petitioned
for a similar certificate. Pan American made an appearance at the hearing
and protested that for sound business reasons only one American air car-
rier should be allowed to service the North Atlantic routes. This sponsor-
ship of the "chosen instrument" theory was unavailing. The Board or-
dered that the petition be granted for a seven year temporary certificate,
stating that "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air transport system of the United States" was a mandate
of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 for international as well as domestic
air service."4 Although it is true that this situation concerned prices and
services to U.S. nationals more directly than does the Webb law, it deals
with services rendered outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. by Americans
to nationals of all countries.
In 1945, in the North Atlantic Route Case,75 the same problem arose
on a larger scale. Many companies were bidding for certificates to serve
Europe and Pan American once more espoused the idea of the "chosen
instrument." Again the board granted the petition of American Export
and gave a certificate to the same territories to Transcontinental and
Western Airlines (now Trans World Airlines). The necessity for com-
petition in foreign route service for American airlines was regarded as
settled. The Board answered the contention of Pan American that the
spur of competition would be supplied by foreign companies by pointing
out that one of the main benefits to society from competition was the
stimulus to develop better and cheaper means of production and that
73. Vernon, Postwar Trends in International Business Organizations, 38 Am.
EcoN. REv. 94, 95 (1948).
74. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940).
75. Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945).
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American industry would not profit in this manner from competition among
one American company and foreign airlines. Fear was also expressed that
a monopoly grant would give too much power to affect American policy to
one managerial group.
Control of American Export Airlines was bought by American Airlines
and its name was changed to American Overseas Airlines (AOA). In
1948, American and Pan American entered into an agreement by which the
latter was to buy all the assets of the AOA line. The Board turned down
approval of this transaction despite the claims that consolidation would
gain many economies and that Americans were being forced to compete
with foreign airlines which were government monopolies. However, the
President did not sustain the Board's action and ordered the Board to
approve the transaction with the express stipulation that TWA be given
a new and broader certificate to Europe to assure that Pan American did
not have non-competitive routes.76 President Truma took care that his
order was properly interpreted when he expressed his desire for "vigorous
competitive growth by our airlines." 7
However. our nation's policy against combination has not been adopted
merely to stimulate American business initiative. Wherever the United
States has been able to effect regulation of the commerce of any nation it
has pursued that policy.78 Such a course has been undertaken not only
altruistically as a manifestation of a sincere desire for the general welfare
but also with regard to the benefits Americans might reap, either eco-
nomically from competitive world markets or politically from the dismem-
berment of powerful economic combines ever prepared for mobilization.
Recent political developments have demanded production in the West-
ern World at almost any price. Thus, many of the policies which would
otherwise be more actively promoted are temporarily de-emphasized. How-
ever, many still preserve their vitality and the others are held in readiness
until world conditions again permit their implementation.
Military Occupation Policies. American arms brought the jurisdic-
tion of our nation to foreign lands steeped in the tradition of cartels.
Indeed, these combines were at the heart of the war-making power of
Germany and Japan. Of course, the economic problems we faced in deal-
ing with the conquered nations involved primarily an attempt to sap their
war potential and secondarily a sometimes contradictory program to bring
them a self-supporting economy. But the anti-cartel policy was envisioned
as a long term bulwark to support both of these objectives, and in the part
of Germany and in all of Japan where the United States had actual au-
thority steps were or are being taken to promote it.
76. North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, Dckt. No. 3589, July 10, 1950, C.A.B.
Order Ser. No. E-4410.
77. Id. at 6. The intricacies of international jurisdiction have caused some slight
recanting on the full competition position; see IATA Traffic Conference Resolution,
6 C.A.B. 639 (1946).
78. See Policy on Elimination of Cartel and Other Trade Restrictions, 21 DFP'T
STATE BULL. 910 (1949).
NOTES
In Japan, the policy of our government is based on the Post-Surrender
Directive issued December 6, 1945, which was supported by the Allies'
Far Eastern Commission in its Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. 79
There economic pacification was recognized as the basic theory which was
to be implemented by the break-up of the mighty concentration of power in
Japanese industry. The Supreme Commander declared void all restrictive
contracts of Japanese companies, ordered divestiture by holding com-
panies of control of smaller enterprises, and banks and credit control were
reorganized along democratic lines. The new Japanese government was
schooled in American economic thought. Anti-trust laws were passed and
a Fair Trade Commission was set up to enforce them. These laws pro-
hibit restrictive contracts and limit inter-company corporate control. There
has also been established a Japanese Holding Company Liquidation Com-
mission and laws similar to our SEC legislation have been passed. The
government acquired control of the larger industrial accomplices and sold
their securities in small parcels to the citizenry.
In Germany the problem was more complex. The economy of Europe
was dependent in large part on the production of the coal mines and steel
mills of Eastern Germany. Any serious mistake in reforming that part of
the German economy would vibrate throughout the continent and would
perhaps invite the Eastern enemy to exploit the resulting dislocation. How-
ever, the American Military Government passed the basic decartelization-
deconcentration law Number 56.80 This prohibited restrictive agreements
among Germans and among Germans and foreigners. Formal terminations
of pre-war cartel agreements were demanded for the Military Government's
files. That law, entitled "Prohibition of Excessive Concentration of German
Economic Power," also contains provisions authorizing the break-up of
monopolistic or over-size pools of German industrial power. The British
Zone commander ruled in like manner and also joined with the United
States in passing Zone Control Law Number 75 which dealt specifically
with the coal and steel combines of the Ruhr.8' Dissolution of control and
reorganization of those industries were there decreed but the present state
of deconcentration in this area is unclear since the Schuman plan is still
under consideration by Western European powers.8 2 The Allied Control
Council has also promulgated laws in sympathy with this over-all program.
The state monopoly of the motion picture industry was broken by law
Number 24 and is being returned to private ownership under competitive
conditions. Under Allied Control Council Law Number 9 the I. G.
Farben chemical combine was seized and in the United States Zone the
79. McCoy, U.S. Suspends Consideration of Proposals for Japanese Deconcen-
tration of Finance and Industry, 20 DEi'T STATE BuLL. 768 (1948).
80. 1950 Hearings at 152.
81. Reorganization of German Coal, Iron and Steel Industries, 20 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 704 (1948).
82. The Schuman Plan, a proposal to integrate the coal and steel industries of
Western Europe under supernational control, was reduced to treaty form and signed
by delegates of the participating countries. Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1951,
p. 3, col. 1.
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Farben plants are being operated by separate trustees. Plans are under-
way to assure permanent deconcentration.6 Finally, the newly-organized
West German government itself has given its commitment to the Allied
High Commission to take action against cartels. It is significant that one
of the powers specifically delegated to the Federal Government of Ger-
many under the Bonn Constitution is that of preventing the abuse of
economic power.84
Certainly our nation has most rigorously enforced the competitive
ideal in lands where it has held sovereign power. But this power has been
pursued in areas beyond our direct control where our largesse has given
us some degree of regulatory power as a condition on the grant of our
bounty.
E. C. A. The Congress of the United States in 1948 passed the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Act in order "to promote world peace and the general
welfare . . . through economic . . .measures necessary to the mainte-
nance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive ... ." 85
Assistance was to be granted by our nation to any European country which
pledged to cooperate in the American economic assistance program under
agreements between that government and the United States. One of the
undertakings demanded of the countries to be aided was that they co-
operate in stimulating an increased interchange of goods among all nations
and that they reduce barriers to trade among the nations of the world. The
Department of State in executing these agreements with foreign powers has
interpreted these words to mean barriers erected both by the governments
and by private businessmen. Every ECA agreement includes as one of
the undertakings by the aided nation a promise that that nation will take
measures to prevent, on the part of private enterprises, business practices
affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to
markets or foster monopolistic control whenever such practices have the
effect of interfering with European recovery.8 6
Each agreement also contains interpretative notes which specify the
meaning of restrictive business practices as: fixing prices on terms to be
observed in the purchase, sale or lease of any product; excluding enter-
prises from, or allocating or dividing, any territorial market or field of
business, or allocating customers or fixing sales or purchase quotas; dis-
crimination; curtailing production; preventing by agreement the develop-
83. See 1950 Hearings, Memorandum of U.S. State Department on Decarte iza-
tion of Germany. But see the rebuttal by the Department of Justice, id. at 154.
84. BAsic LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, c. VII, art. 74, clause
16. A copy of this constitution is printed by the U.S. Army, OMGUS 9-1676, May,
1949.
85. 62 STAT. 137 (1948), 7 U.S.C. § 612 (1948).
86. This provision appears as art. II, 3 of every ECA agreement. See U.S.
TREATY SER. (Dep't State), Nos. 1780 (Austria), 1781 (Belgium), 1782 (Den-
mark), 1783 (France), 1784 (French Zone, Germany), 1785 (England-U.S. Zone,
Germany), 1786 (Greece), 1787 (Iceland), 1788 (Ireland), 1789 (Italy), 1790
(Luxemburg), 1791 (Netherlands), 1792 (Norway), 1793 (Sweden), 1794 (Turkey),
1795 (England), 2024 (Federal Republic of Germany).
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ment or application of patented or unpatented technology; or extending the
use of rights under patents, trademarks or copyrights granted by either
country to matters which are not within the scope of such grants, or to
products or conditions of production not within those grants.8 7 Agree-
ments of this sort have been concluded with every European nation with
the exception of Spain, Portugal and the Iron Curtain countries. It is
interesting to note that the Convention for European Economic Cooperation
which was entered into by eighteen nations of Western Europe to prepare
multilaterally for the reception of ECA aid makes no mention of anti-cartel
undertakings.8 8 Here, then, we see a broad attempt by the United States to
induce the rest of the world t6 accept the fundamental American economic
policy of free competition.
The United States did not bargain for this policy solely where the
chaos of war had left the cooperating nations ready to agree to any reason-
able conditions on receipt of vitally necessary aid. Since the close of World
War II the Department of State has sought to modernize the commercial
treaties of the United States to promote freer channels of international
intercourse.
Commercial Treaties. So that the Point Four program and other
measures for strengthening the economy of the free world might receive
cooperation from the American investor, treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation have been concluded with other nations to protect American
capital abroad. Treaties of this nature have been signed with China, Italy,
Uruguay, and Ireland. Such treaties have been proposed to thirty other
nations and two-thirds of these projects are in varying stages of comple-
tion.89 The treaty with 'Uruguay illustrates how the anti-cartel policy is
pursued in these agreements. 90 There it is agreed that both nations recog-
nize that business pactices which restrain competition, limit access to
markets or foster monopolistic control, and which are engaged in by one
or more private or public commercial enterprises may have harmful effects
upon commerce between the countries. It is accordingly agreed in those
treaties that the signatories will consult with each other on specific cases
and to take appropriate measures with a view to eliminating such harmful
effects, °1
1. T. 0. American foreign economic policy was not envisioned as a
program to be implemented merely by bilateral agreements. In the days
of good feeling immediately after World War II the United States looked
upon that policy as a platform to be urged upon the great World Assembly
in the United Nations. Therefore, in 1945 the State Department published
87. These appear in the annex to each of the above agreements at 1f 3.
88. 10 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIO NS 244 (1948). This was the
Convention for European Economic Cooperation, signed at Paris, April 16, 1948.
89. Expanding World Trade: U.S. Policy and Program, 24 DEP'T STATE BULL.
213, 217 (1951).
90. 96 CONG. REC. 12283 (1950).
91. Treaty with Uruguay, art. XIV.
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its "Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment" 92 as
a prologue to an International Trade Organization Charter. Those pro-
posals advocated a release of trade from restrictions placed upon it either
by governments or private cartels. The Department indicted the latter as
having been used to fix prices, allocate markets, curtail production, sup-
press technological advance, and exclude trade rivals. Among the many
other considerations relevant to world trade, it was therefore proposed
that signatories to the proposed Charter individually and concertedly take
measures to curb restrictive business practices in international trade which
frustrate the expansion of production or trade on the maintenance within
all countries of high levels of employment and real income. The Organiza-
tion was* to further this purpose by setting up a division to receive com-
plaints concerning restrictive practices, to demand information on them
from the nations involved, and to make a recommendation in the appro-
priate case to the nations in a position to take action to eliminate these
restrictions.
These proposals were elaborated upon in a United States "Suggested
Charter" which was the basis of discussion for a London meeting of a
Preparatory Committee appointed by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations in 1946.-3 At this conference a draft Charter was
devised which, after amendments in further hearings was submitted to the
representatives of fifty-three nations who met at Havana in 1947 to adopt
a "Charter for an International Trade Organization."
The final draft of the Charter which was there signed by the repre-
sentatives of all the nations present contained prohibitions on all restraints
on international trade whether by government or by private individuals.
The Charter deals with tariffs, quotas, discrimination, subsidies, monetary
exchange practices and contains a chapter on cartels practically identical
with that suggested in the "Proposals" of the United States.9 4 One signifi-
cant amendment was added to make state-trading enterprises subject to
the same restrictions as those imposed by that Chapter on private enter-
prises. 5 Thereby was accomplished the first effort to establish inter-
national machinery to deal with the problems of cartels,-done through the
efforts of the United States State Department to implement multilaterally
an American economic policy of free competition.
The Charter was submitted to the United States Senate for ratification
in April, 1949.96 Hearings on the Charter were held but no action was
taken and Secretary of State Acheson decided that the Charter would not
be resubmitted to the 82d Congress. At that time he attempted. to explain
92. Dep't of State, Publication 2411, Com. Pol. Series 79 (1945).
93. For the history of this development see Bronz, Intentational Trade Organi-
sation. Charter, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1090n. (1949).
94. The Charter itself and an outline of it can be found in Havana Charter for
an International Trade Organization, March 24, 1948, Dep't of State Publication
3206, Com. Pol. Series 114 (1948).
95. Bidwell and Diebold, U.S. and the ITO, International Conciliation, March,
1949, p. 226.
96. SEN. Doc. No. 61, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
the slackening of interest in the Charter by pointing to the attainment of
many of its purposes by other means and the alternative piecemeal programs
embarked upon by the United States in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Point Four Program,
9 7
and the Treaties of Commerce, Friendship, and Navigation entered into
by the United States.98 Notwithstanding the failure to complete execution
of this Charter, there is significance in the fact that our nation devised and
earnestly supported a great adventure in multilateral international cartel
suppression."
Thus, whenever in recent times the United States has had an oppor-
tunity to make its voice heard in international councils or make its example
felt in the sovereign bodies of any other state it has urged free competition
as an economic ideal' 00 and has succeeded to some extent in releasing
world trade from the burdens of cartels.
The Inconsistency. The existence of the Webb-Pomerene Act along-
side of this aggressive foreign policy seems inconsistent at best. Of course
this divergence can be explained by pointing out that the Webb Act was
enacted as a defensive measure to practices which the United States has
not yet completely succeeded in eradicating from world trade and that the
inconsistency would only become real when the policies of the State Depart-
ment have been in fact implemented adequately throughout the world. 1' 1
Yet, foreign scholars have always referred to Webb associations as
cartels ' 0 2 and as late as last year a Vienna publication cited them as an
example of American cartel tolerance in an article in opposition to a pro-
posed Austrian anti-trust law.0O Certainly the associations can give our
foreign policy on this question a "bad press" in foreign countries. Again,
if a Webb association was cited as an offender under any of our treaties of
Commerce, Friendship and Navigation it would lead to great national
embarrassment. 14
These activities of the State Department indicate that American busi-
ness is in a greatly different position than that which obtained when the
97. See Inaugural Address of President Truman, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1949,
p. 4, col. 3.
98. Expanding World Trade, supra note 89, at 218.
99. The participation of the United States in formulating the Charter and Secre-
tary of State Acheson's high hopes for it are contained in his remarks before a
Committee of Congress, The ITO Charter-A Code of Fair Trade Practices, 22
DEP'T STATz BULL. 689 (1950).
100. STOCKING AND WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 72, at 287.
101. See the statement of FTC Export Division Chief Phelps, 1950 Hearings, at
131.
102. TNEC HEARINGS, pt. 25, p. 13348.
103. 1950 Hearings, at 176. This was in the testimony of John C. Stedman, Chief
of the Legislative Section, Anti-Trust Division, Department of Justice.
104. However, Winthrop Brown, Director of the Office on International Trade
Policy, Dep't of State, has said that as long as associations stay out of cartels
probably no embarrassment will be suffered in presenting a competitive program
to other nations. Possibly, Mr. Brown didn't consider areas in which American
exporters effectively control a foreign market.
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Webb Act was passed. Certainly the United States is the largest exporting
country in the world. 0 5 The chronic dollar shortage, which is certainly
not a war-born phenomenon, evidences that our nation has a very favorable
balance of trade. The industrial giants of the United States have risen to
world prominence and have little to fear from any combination operating
from any nation. It is true that there are still small American enterprises
that may need aid in competing with the American giants and with sur-
viving cartels in foreign trade but the present legislation allows firms of any
size to combine.
ANALYsIs
Aside from the effect that the Webb dispensation may have on our
attempts to "sell" competition to other nations, the law is also defective
in that it permits activities directly injurious to the foreign consumer and,
more important, indirectly deleterious to the domestic economy.10 This
proposition is supported by a consideration of the evils our anti-trust policy
is designed to forestall. The harmful effects of monopolies and monopoly
practices may be broken down into three groups: restraints on entry into
an industry; lessening of the stimulation to economic enterprise; and the
curtailment of production.
Restraints on Entry. The presence of a large concentration of power
which dominates an industry can prevent or inhibit the entry into its field
of production by any outsider. It can buy materials more cheaply, produce
more cheaply and sell more cheaply because of its established position and
its high volume consumption, production and distribution. Of course, as
the size of an enterprise -increases its managerial problems multiply and
lessen efficiency. But its very size affords it the economic resource to un-
dersell a competitor for a sufficient length of time to bring him to heel.
When such a restraint occurs, the freedom of the individual to turn his
talents in any direction which the general economy will allow to gain
profitable employment is restricted. Thus, private companies can limit
entrepreneurial freedom. Such practices also limit the avenues through
which invested capital can be utilized for profit.
The Lessening of Economic Stimulation. When a corporation or com-
bine controls an industry it has little to gain through economic experi-
mentation. Entrepreneurial lassitude is not visited with the crushing sanc-
tions always present in competitive industry. In such a situation there is
no incentive to undergo the risks or bear the expense of progress in pro-
duction methods or improvement of the product. Neither is any demand
105. For the absolute figures see the U.S. Statistical Abstracts for the past five
years.
106. The small amount of business now handled by Webb associations suggests
that the problem may be de inininis. But the Dep't of Justice thinks that it is not
so for two reasons: U.S. hopes for and expects a largely expanded world trade; and,
since the Anti-Trust Division has recently turned serious attention towards cartel
practices, American companies will be tempted to continue such practices under the
guise of "associations." 1950 Hearings at 177.
present for efficiency within the status quo. Without such a demand man-
agement is not forced to exert itself to eliminate waste, and labor will not
be bargained with in a competitive atmosphere since management can pass
the cost of its largesse along to the public.
The Lowering of Production. This is the most serious and the most
obvious effect of monopolization. When an enterprise operates in a com-
petitive industry it must meet a price set by factors beyond its control. If
it charges more than the economic cost for a commodity (which includes
a competitive profit) it will be undersold by its competitors. In a monop-
olized industry however, the combine can charge what the traffic will bear.
This will, of course, lower consumption and thus lessen volume production
savings but the balance of revenue over investment will be largest at a
price above that set under competitive conditions., Since the higher price
will lower consumption, production must be cut back and thus employment
is reduced. 'Lowered production also lessens the amount of raw materials
used and the number of distributors needed for the finished product.
Finally we come to the direct effect of the rise in price. If a commodity is
not considered a necessity many will not purchase it when it is sold at
monopoly prices. Thus the price deprives them of the benefits which our
advanced economy could afford them under competitive conditions. If the
commodity is considered a necessity or an attainable luxury the monop-
olistic price demands too large a share of the wealth of the consumer. The
freedom of the individual to utilize his wealth for consumption is not
limited only by factors beyond human control but is directed by monop-
olistic management.
Effect of Webb Act. The effect of Webb associations upon the foreign
consumer certainly produces some of the above evils. First, foreigners as
foreigners have no right to seek freedom of entry into the American
export business. Second, if there is competition selling in the foreign
markets by other than American producers, or combines including Amer-
icans, the foreign consumer need not fear curtailments of production or the
lessening of economic stimulation. However, there may be situations in
which American associations control the total supply to that market in the
commodity or where the association has entered into an international cartel
to control the supply there; if such is the case, the foreign market will fall
heir to all the evils mentioned above.
The theory of the Webb Act is that American producers or exporters
can combine for export trade without seriously harming the domestic
economy. But there is some discrepancy between this theory and the
business facts.10 7 The three provisos included in the act seem to negative
all possible evils to the American market but it is submitted that if they
were literally enforced they would result in a negation of the whole idea of
unlimited export combination.
107. In one of the TNEC headline investigations, a cartel entrepreneur admitted
that restraints on American foreign trade would inevitably be felt domestically. TNEC
HEAmUNGS, pt. 25, p. 13132.
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First, Webb associations and their activities are not liable to prosecu-
tion under the Sherman Act unless they restrain trade within the United
States. Aside from the theoretical harm that any export combination may
visit upon the domestic economy the opportunity is afforded by this law to
businessmen bent upon restraining domestic trade to conclude these re-
straints under the cover of legality.108 Adam Smith charged that no group
of businessmen could get together even socially without some restraint
being effected. How can assurance be given that producers who are meet-
ing to fix prices or allocate orders for the export market will not allow
their minds to wander to contemplate price policies and production in the
domestic market? 109 The temptation would indeed be great and detection
would be almost impossible. But even if the management groups par-
ticipating in these associations stayed on the straight path of export trade
any combination that could be formed would inevittibly injure the American
market.
As pointed out above, monopolies or monopolistic policies harm
society. Combination for export may likewise so affect the American
economy.
First, would export combination restrain entry of American capital
or entrepreneurs into any field of activity? Entry into the export field can
best be considered under the second proviso which deals directly with this
problem. However, these associations could possibly restrain entry into
the field of production or limit the expansion of firms within the industry
represented by the association. If the association was large enough it could
preclude non-members from the export market by using its size to under-
sell them and by closing up possible sale avenues through exclusive agree-
ments. In fact, the export market might not be a large portion of the total
market available to American producers but it would amount to exclusion
from a substantial share of the market, a practice condemned in principle
by the International Salt Case.110 But even if no producer was denied entry
into an association the allocation of orders among the members would
result in a restraint upon expansion within the industry represented, since
setting quotas for export trade would limit the foreign market available.
In the past quotas have been set generally upon the basis of total produc-
tion or of past exports or of production probably available for export.
Another problem is raised when the member company decides to get out
of the association in order to beat this rationing. In the past associations
have restricted competition after withdrawal.
Second, combination for export cannot be said to lessen American
economic stimulation. Since the domestic market must remain competitive,
it is difficult to see how export combination could work harm in this respect.
108. The TNEC Hearings showed that was little hope of industrialists separating
foreign and domestic price policies in their minds. Id. at 13158.
109. Mr. Stedman of the Dep't of Justice has cited the history of abuse by Webb
associations of the privileges of the Act, 1950 Hearings at 176.
110. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). In fact, no
case of exclusion from an association has been brought to the attention of the FTC.
1950 Hearings at 137.
Third, how does combination for export curtain production? Prob-
ably if the foreign market is one in which the association competes with
foreign made goods, no price setting would be possible and, therefore, no
output reduction would be undertaken. If for any reason, however, that
market is not competitive, American employment, use -of American raw
materials and of American transporters and handlers would also be affected.
The second proviso of the Webb Act forbids activities which are in
restraint of the trade of any American exporter. Here again there is the
problem of restraint on entry or expansion levied on American capital or
entrepreneurs. Certainly if a number of producers combine in channeling
their products overseas, they have a tremendous competitive advantage
over the American who buys in the domestic market to sell abroad. How-
ever, the plight of the exporter is much worse if he cannot buy products
from the association's members because he is an exporter or can only buy
through the association where he loses the value of having competitive
sellers. There is a further danger to the independent exporter that the
member companies or the association itself may charge him discriminatory
prices. Again, the association may tie up foreign sales channels by the use
of exclusive contracts.'
Finally, the Webb Act forbids activities which artificially or intention-
ally raise or lower American prices. It competition is preserved in the
domestic market the only artificial effect possible on domestic prices would
be from a concerted effort in foreign dumping, but even this would be only
temporary." 2 Economists point out another harm in the piling up on
American accounts of worthless foreign currency but this effect would prob-
ably be infinitesimal.
In summary, it seems that the safeguards provided in the Webb Act
are inadequate to protect the American economy from certain evils and
should be made more specific to cope with others. In order to avoid pos-
sible embarrassments and inconsistencies in our foreign economic policy
and to avoid the possible harmful effects of these associations on our
domestic economy, bills have been introduced in Congress to repeal or
amend the act. Most of the complaints against it are grounded on the
possibility that the associations can be used by the most powerful members
of our economic community."13 Therefore, if some limit could be placed
on the size of potential members of the associations, most opposition would
vanish "14 while the stated purpose of the act, help for the small business-
man, would remain intact.
111. The TNEC Hearings showed that one of the principal "problems" of the
associations was the difficulty in controlling the entire export of a commodity, Letter
of Transmittal of TNEC Mono. 6, p. XII. To accomplish this some rigorous tactics
were adopted, TNEC HEARINGS, pt. 20, p. 10973.
112. However, the TNEC HEARINGS show that no price fixing will be without
effect on American prices, id., pt. 25, p. 13158; and see LYNCH, CONCENTRATION OF
EcoNoMIc POWER 234 (1949).
113. In the latest public listing of the members of the associations in 1945, none
of the 49 extant associations was composed solely of small businesses; in 16 of them
there was no small business participation whatsoever, 1946 REPORT, Exhibit 5.
114. Proposals to limit the size of members permitted in an association have been
advanced before. This could be accomplished by limiting members to those whose
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PROPOSALS
One feature of the present act which has received some adverse com-
ment is that it contains no effective means to put a potential law-breaker
in terrorem. Its only enforcement provision is the direction to the FTC to
recommend changes in the associations found to be operating unlawfully.
If those recommendations are not complied with all the FTC may do is
refer the matter to the Attorney General for his discretionary action.
Although it is true that in no case has an association refused to comply,
and although if there is no compliance and the Attorney General chooses
to prosecute under the anti-trust laws and does so successfully, punishment
will follow for the errant association, the action taken by the FTC has no
sanction for refusal to comply. Thus, an association has little to fear from
the commission's watch-dog activities.
To clarify existing ambiguities, to ensure protection from potential
harm to the American economy and to bring the Webb Act more in line
with our foreign policy, while accomplishing the primary purpose for which
the act was passed, the following amendments are submitted:1 5
1. The FTC shall have the power to issue orders whenever it finds a
violation of the provisions of the Webb Act, which will be of the same
force and effect as the orders rendered by the Commission in unfair trade
practice cases under the Federal Trade Commission Act." 6
2. No corporation shall be permitted to become or remain a member
of an association if that corporation has produced within the two years
before the investigation more than twenty-five per cent of the class of com-
modities dealt in by the association. The production of the corporation will
include for this purpose the production of the same class of commodities by
any of its affiliates." 7  The determination as to proportional production
production of the class of commodities dealt in by the association was less than
some percentage of total American production of that class. 1950 HEARINGS suggests
30% as the critical figure; STOCKING AND WATKINS, op. cit. mipra note 72, suggest
10%.
115. Somewhat more ambitious proposals were offered to a Congressional Sub-
committee by a Webb-Pomerene expert, Myron W. Watkins; see 1950 HEARINGS
(Comm. Print No. 1, Jan. 27, 1950) at 79. It will be noted that Mr. Watkins was
the co-author of CARTELS OR CoMPETITIoN, op. cit. supra note 72.
116. The FTC believes it would have this power if the Webb Act did not
specifically direct otherwise, 1950 Hearings at 228.
117. The Chief of the Export Trade Division of the FTC has opposed such a
limitation, 1950 Hearings at 124. Twenty-five per cent seemed a proper figure on
the basis of a consideration of CONCENTRATION OF EcoNoMIc POWER (TNEC Mono-
graph 21, 1940). There it was suggested that price leadership and other tendencies
toward .monopoly or monopolistic practices were most generally present in industries
where trade was dominated by four or less producers. Little harm to the domestic
economy need be feared from combinations for export which do not include industry
dominators. If the limit were set anywhere above 25% it is possible that an associa-
tion might contain all the important firms in an industry dominated by four pro-
ducers if they all produced the same amount. Of course, 100% control is not
necessary for domination, but control approximating that figure is necessary to so
control American export that an association be useful for other than operating
economies, for which large companies are in no need. See note 111 mipra.
shall be made by the use of the same classification system as is used by the
Bureau of the Census for its annual surveys of American business." 8
3. No foreign person or business association shall be permitted to be-
come an association member and no agreement between an association and
such foreign enterprises shall be permitted if such agreement is in restraint
of American foreign or domestic trade." 9
4. Sales made by an association or any of its members will be within
the operation of the Robinson-Patman Act notwithstanding that such sales
are made for resale outside the United States. No member of an associa-
tion may restrict the resale of any commodity so as to exclude resale of
that commodity to any American exporterY.
20
5. No producer of a commodity within the class of commodities dealt
in by the association, not otherwise disqualified by the act, can be refused
entry into such association unless because of the faulty credit position of
the producer, the poor quality of his product, his poor relations with foreign
nations by reason of his previous conduct or because of some other threat
to the good will of the association. Anyone so refused can appeal to the
FTC for an order to enforce admission.'
2 '
6. No association can conclude contracts with any of its members
binding them to continued membership for a period of more than five years
or binding them to refrain from competition in export with the association
for a period of more than two years after withdrawal from such association.
Perhaps repeal would be the ideal solution to the problems caused by
the Webb Act,'2 2 but the political power to gain such an objective would be
hard to obtain '1 and some real justification for the act may be presented
if the state trading agencies now being adopted by foreign powers continue
to do a large share of import buying abroad.'
2 4
Donald M. Collins
118. How to draw a size limitation provision without wide open loop holes is a
difficult problem. See 1950 Hearings at 183. The census classifications, however,
seem to meet most objections.
119. There is still need of clarification on this point. Mr. Phelps, supra note
103, still abides by the "reasonable" test first proposed in the "Silver Letter," 1950
Hearings at 138.
120. Representative Multer has asked that amendments go further and force the
associations to sell to American exporters, 1950 Hearings at 94.
121. This might be inadequate if the dues for the association are too high for
small business participation. Such practices have occurred; see 1950 Hearings at
117. However, if the size limitation is applied, this problem would probably be
obviated.
122. Legislation was introduced to do this but no action was taken, H.R.
4493, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). Representative Multer backs up this suggestion,
1950 Hearings at 97.
123. Representative Multer said that although he thought repeal was the proper
fate of the Webb Act it would be impossible to achieve because of the opposing
pressure of big business. Ibid. That pressure could hardly be asserted with a straight
face against the present proposals.
124. The Letter of Transmittal in the 1946 REPORT stated that the Webb Act
benefited only big business, made discovery of domestic restraints difficult, and sug-
gested repeal. However, substitute legislation was advised which would avoid these
evils and yet allow some combination to combat foreign governmental buying
monopolies.
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Postmarital Transfer and the Estate and Gift Taxes
The case of Cornelia Harris v. Comm'r,' recently decided by the
Supreme Court, prompts this investigation into the estate and gift tax
status of postnuptial transfers of property. The only other Supreme Court
decisions in the area of marital transfers are concerned with transfers pur-
suant to antenuptial agreements.2 Thus, an examination of the tax theories
behind these cases is necessary in order to point up any similarity or
difference between these two problems which might justify the same or
different tax treatment.
Although the Harris case involves only the gift tax, it is necessary to
consider the application of the estate tax to the same problems, since the
two taxes are to be read in conjunction with each other.8 The gift tax is
designed to reach any inter vivos transfer of property which otherwise
would be a part of the transferor's taxable gross estate had he died before
making the transfer.4 Accordingly, the cases and theories of the estate
tax relative to this problem will be set forth initially, in order to point out
just what property belongs in the gross estate of a taxpayer. If certain
property is considered part of the taxable gross estate at death, certainly
any inter vivos transfer of that property before death would not result in a
tax free depletion of the transferor's estate, and 'hence should not be subject
to the gift tax.
The next section, concerning the gift tax, will be divided into two sub-
sections chronologically, with the 1945 decision of Merrill v. Fahs 5 as the
dividing line. The reasons for this approach are two: that decision was
the first authoritative declaration that the gift and estate taxes were in
pari ivateria; and the companion case of Comrn'r v. Wemyss 6 unequivocally
laid down the rule that donative intent was not the test for determining the
applicability of the gift tax. Since all the decisions after this date should
have been governed by these rules, they are better considered in a category
separate from pre-1945 decisions.
ESTATE TAX
Section 811 (b)-The Revenue Act of 1916 7 was the first tax statute
which imposed an estate tax. Its pattern has been used ever since. As
originally written there was no section of the Act which expressly required
the inclusion of property passing to a surviving spouse by virtue of a dower
1. 71 Sup. Ct. 181 (1950). See 64 HAgv. L. REv. 1019 (1951).
2. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
(1945).
3. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311; Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S.
39, 44 (1939).
4. Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939) ; Comn'r v. Barnard's
Estate, 176 F.2d 233, 235 (1949).
5. 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
6. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
7. 39 STAT. 756 (1916).
or curtesy interest in the decedent's gross estate. One of the first cases to
be handed down on the question of whether property passing to a surviving
spouse because of her dower interests should be included in the decedent's
This was clearly contra to legislative intention, for Congress, hoping to
avoid such a decision by the courts, had already passed the Revenue Act
of 1918 9 which added the provision to the law, now Section 811 (b), which
specifically required the inclusion of the value of such marital interest in
the decedent's gross estate. This provision was considered at the time as
a clarifying provision rather than as a change in the law,' 0 indicating that
the above decision was most likely incorrect.
Consequently the Regulations .have consistently stated that the effect
of Section 811 (b) is to require the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate
of the full value of the property, without deduction of the value of the
interest of the surviving spouse and without regard to the time when the
right to such interest arose."
The courts, with the exception of the above case, have carried out the
clear legislative intent to the fullest, 12 even holding that all of decedent's
property will be included in his gross estate whether the wife elects to take
under the will or not.'3 However, it has been held, consistently with
property law, that Section 811 (b) is not applicable to irrevocable inter vivos
transfers, even though made pursuant to an antenuptial agreement whereby
the decedent creates a trust which is to be in lieu of his wife's dower
rights.14 The applicability of the gift tax to this type of transfer will be
considered under the section devoted to the gift tax.
Section 812(b)-Although there has always been a provision allowing
deduction of certain claims against the estate for the purpose of determining
the net estate, the direct ancestor of Section 812(b) is Section 303(a) of
the Revenue Act of 1926.15 Prior to 1926, in order for a claim to be de-
ductible, it had to be supported by a "fair consideration in money or money's
worth." The 1926 Act substituted the words "adequate and full" for the
word "fair" and the present act so provides.'
In 1932 two interesting amendments to this section of the Act were
made.17  The first amendment specifically provided that the value of a
8. Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993 (D.C. Tenn. 1920).
9. Tit. IV, §402(b), 40 STAT. 1097 (1918).
10. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918); reprinted 1939-1 Cum.
Bu. pt. 2, 101. For a hindsight view see Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311
(1945).
11. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.14 (1939).
12. Mayer v. Reinecke, 130 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1942).
13. Henderson v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 404 (Ct. Cl. 1937).
14. Estate of Harry E. Byram, 9 T.C. 1 (1947).
15. 44 STAT. 72 (1926).
16. Revenue Act of 1924, § 303(a), 43 STAT. 306 (1924); INT. RLv. CoDE
§812(b) ; see 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION § 11.23 (1942).
17. Revenue Act of 1932, §§804, 805, 47 STAT. 280 (1932), now INT. Rr.v
CoDE § 812(b).
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relinquished or promised relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or other marital
right was not "consideration in money or money's worth." Since Section
811(b) required the inclusion of such marital interests in the gross estate,
any interpretation which would have allowed the value of such an interest
to constitute consideration for an otherwise unallowable deduction would
have been subversive to this intent. Therefore, this change was thought
to be declaratory of existing law.' 8
The 1932 Act also added the qualification limiting claims deductions
"founded on a promise or agreement" to the extent they were contracted
in good faith for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth.19 The legislative purpose behind this amendment was to make it
uncontrovertably clear that all tort claims and other obligations implied
by law are deductible without the necessity of satisfying the consideration
requirements necessary for contract claims.
20
The Regulations have said little more than the Act itself, merely
specifying that the release of such marital rights does not constitute adequate
consideration in money or money's worth.
2 1
In so far as antenuptial agreements were concerned, the courts have
had little or no trouble seeing through attempts to evade the purpose of
Section 811(b) by claiming contract claim deductions under Section
812(b). In the relatively early case of Jacobs v. Comm'r,2 2 which in-
volved the Revenue Act of 1921,23 the court disallowed a deduction based
on a wife's claim arising from an antenuptial agreement whereby the wife
released all dower and other marital rights in consideration for husband's
promise to pay her $75,000 if she survived him. The court in this case
based its decision on the fact that the wife actually took under the will, and
therefore its pre~edent value is not too strong. However, the court in
Empire Trust Co. v. Comm'r,24 a case involving substantially the same
problem, went to the heart of the statute in reaching a similar result tax-
wise. This is proved by its statement:
"The statute is explicit in including dower in the gross estate of a
deceased individual. To allow a deduction through substitution, by a
mutual agreement, of an amount fixed in lieu of dower would be an
evasion of the statute." 2
It is interesting to note that the court in the Empire Trust case had
the advantage of hindsight, for the Revenue Act of 1932 had already been
18. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1931); SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess., 50 (1931); reprinted 1939-1 CuM. Buu. pt. 2, 491.
19. Revenue Act of 1932, § 805, 47 STAT. 280 (1932).
20. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1931); SEN. REP. No. 665,
72d Cong., 1st Sess 51 (1931) ; reprinted 1939-1 Cum. BuLu. pt. 2, 491.
21. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §§ 81.29, 81.36 (1939).
22. 34 F2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929).
23. Revenue Act of 1921, § 403, 42 STAT. 279 (1921).
24. 94 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1938).
25. Id. at 309.
passed by the time the court decided the case.2 6 As a result of this decision
and the change in the Act, the law pertaining to the deductibility of claims
based on premarital arrangements, for which the only consideration is the
release of marital rights, seems to be well settled.
When the courts analyzed postnuptial settlements, however, they had
greater difficulty reaching consistent decisions. The first type of post-
nupptial problems involves situations in which the spouses are only legally
separated at the time of death. All property which passes to the surviving
spouse generally passes pursuant to a separation agreement for which the
usual consideration is the release of marital rights in the decedent's prop-
erty. This problem is analogous to the problem of antenuptial agree-
ments,27 and the courts have consistently held that the release of these
marital rights is not sufficient consideration to allow a claim based thereon
to be deducted from the gross estate of the deceased spouse.
28
The second type of postnuptial problem arises in cases where the
parties have been absolutely divorced. In some of these cases the parties
have made property settlements prior to the divorce decree and did not ask
the divorce court to settle this question.2 9 In other cases the parties had
their agreements incorporated into the divorce decrees; 3 0 and in still
another group of cases, the divorce court itself divided the property by its
decree.3 1 The question of whether any or all of these transactions create
claims which are deductible from the gross estate has been answered in
various ways. However, most of the courts agree that where the property
passes pursuant to a divorce decree, any claim based on this decree is a
deductible claim; 3 2 and that where the property is transferred by virtue
of a settlement agreement, no deductible claim arises except to the extent
that the agreement is supported by an adequate consideration "in money
or money's worth." a
When this distinction between a decree and an agreement was applied
to situations where the divorce court incorporated the agreement into the
decree, the results were amazingly inconsistent 3 This problem was
further complicated when the parties provided that their'settlement should
26. See note 18 and text supra.
27. The parties are technically still married at time of death. For the antenuptial
tax result. See notes 22 and 24 and text smtpra.
28. Adriance v. Higgins, 113 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Comm'r v. Weiser, 113
F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Sheets v. Comm'r, 95 F.2d 727 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Cowles
v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. N.Y. 1945); Nantke v. United States, 35
F. Supp. 450 (W.D. N.Y. 1940).
29. Meyer's Estate v. Comm'r, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 651 (1940).
30. Helvering v. U.S. Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Estate of George
Brokaw, 39 B.T.A. 783 (1939); Edythe C. Young, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939).
31. Comm'r v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942).
32. Ibid. Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. W. Va. 1944); Estate of
George Brokaw, 39 B.T.A. 783 (1939); Edythe C. Young, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939).
33. Helvering v. U.S. Trust Co., 111 -F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Meyer's Estate v.
Comm'r, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940); but cf. Markwell's Estate v. Conm'r, 112
F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1940).
34. See cases cited in notes 36 and 37 infra.
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survive any decree, notwithstanding the fact that the local divorce laws
i equired the court to make a property division. 85  When confronted with
these complexities the courts have done one of two things. Either they
have ignored completely the fact that the decree "ratified and approved"
the agreement,3 6 or they have attempted to declare the agreement or the
decree the moving factor by holding that any property to be transferred
had to be transferred pursuant to that factor.
8 7
Until 1946 this problem was still further complicated by the nature
of support rights. The Board of Tax Appeals early indicated an intention
to consider support rights outside of the scope of the "other marital
rights" in Section 812(b). 38 The Second Circuit did not agree and held
in Meyer's Estate v. Comm'r,89 Judge L. Hand dissenting, that support
rights were "other marital rights" and that their release did not consti-
tute adequate consideration in money or money's worth. In August of
1946 the Treasury Department promulgated E.T. 19 which stated that
it was the government's view that the surrender of support rights is not
one of the "other marital rights" referred to in Section 812(b) and that
the cases holding the opposite would no longer be followed.40
The present status of the law seems to be that all marital obligations
which are determined by a decree of a divorce court will be deductible
claims from the gross estate. Also all claims which are founded upon
settlement agreements are deductible to the extent they represent the obli-
gations of support.4 ' However, any claim which is based on an agree-
ment, the consideration for which is the release of dower, curtesy, or
"other marital right" will not be deductible.
Although it has been pointed out that this distinction between a
decree and an agreement is a rather flimsy one upon which to determine
tax consequences,4 nevertheless, the courts, while realizing this,4 have
continued to decide cases on this ground.44 Perhaps the attitude of Judge
35. Although the Harris case involves the gift tax, both the Second Circuit and
the dissent in the Supreme Court discussed this phase of the problem. Harris v.
Comm'r, 71 Sup. Ct. 181, 187, 188, 189 (1950); 178 F.2d 861, 864, 865 (1949).
36. Helvering v. U.S. Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940); Meyer's Estate
v. Comm'r, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940); Estate of George Brokaw, 39 B.T.A. 783
(1939).
37. Comm'r v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); Comm'r v. State Street
Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942); Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F. Supp. 552 (N.D.
W.Va. 1944); Edythe C. Young, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939).
38. Estate of George Brokaw, 39 B.T.A. 783 (1939); Edythe C. .Young, 39
B.T.A. 230 (1939).
39. 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940).
40. 1946-2 Cum. Butt,. 166.
41. Although the McClean case, infra notes 95 and 96 and text pertaining thereto,
throws some doubt on the validity of this statement, it is nevertheless believed that
since the Commissioner will not assert a deficiency claim for the value of the property
which is transferred in consideration for the release of support rights, the question has
become, for most purposes, academic.
42. 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 16, § 11.24.
43. Comm'r v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir. 1946).
44. Ibid.
Mahoney in Comw'r v. State St. Trust Co.4 5 best typifies the approach of
the courts to this problem:
"We cannot escape, however, the clear language of the statute.
Certain it is that Congress may provide the answer to this seeming
incongruity, but it is not for us to reach by judicial interpretation
which would be contrary to the clear statement of the statute." 46
It must be conceded that there is more than sufficient statutory lan-
guage upon which to base these results. The incongruity is caused entirely
by the '32 amendment which was intended to clarify the deductibility of
tort claims. 47 Before this change, the Act provided that all claims were
to be deductible to the extent that they were bona fide and supported
by adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.48 After
the change the act read that all claims, founded upon a "promise or an
agreement," are deductible to the extent that they meet the consideration
requirements.49  Prior to '32 any claim, whether based on a court decree,
a judgment, or a simple contract, had to meet the consideration require-
ment before it was deductible. Congress had no intention of changing
this result by the '32 Act. All Congress wished to do was to make it
clear that any tort claim or other obligation implied by law which might
be outstanding at the time of the decedent's death would be deductible from
his gross estate without the necessity of finding some consideration in
money or money's worth to support it. 0 Unfortunately, the words "prom-
ise or agreement" were put into the statute, the drafters obviously believ-
ing that all non-tort claims were contract claims and that therefore they
should meet the consideration requirements. If instead of the "promise and
agreement" amendment, a clause making all bona fide tort claims de-
ductible had been added, there would have been much less statutory lan-
guage upon which to base the results which represent the current law.
The problems created by divorce are, strictly speaking, not solely
related to either the tort or contract fields. The obligation to support is
an obligation implied by law, just as much as obligation to pay tort
damages is, and to that extent atiy claim based thereon should be deduc-
tible, as the drafters of the '32 amendment intended.&5 1 This result has
finally been reached through E.T. 19.52 Obligations, based on agreements
45. 128 F2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942).
46. Id. at 621.
47. See note 20 and text supra.
48. Revenue Act of 1926, § 303, 44 STAT. 72 (1926).
49. IxT. REv. CODE §812(b) : "The deduction herein allowed in the case of
claims against the estate, . . . , when founded upon a promise or agreement, be
limited to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate considera-
tion in money or money's worth."
50. See note 47 upra.
51. See note 20 supra. See also Judge Learned Hand's dissent in the Meyer's
case, 110 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1940).
52. See note 40 supra.
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for which the consideration is the release of marital rights are, for most
purposes, contractual obligations. While these marital rights are, tech-
nically speaking, also imposed by law, any contract claim to these rights
is not a deductible claim for estate tax purposes.53
Although marital rights in a decedent's estate may constitute a valu-
able consideration for the purposes of enforcing a contract under local
law,54 the mere fact that a local court will enforce such a contract should
not automatically mean that it is supported by consideration "in money
or money's worth" for tax purposes. For example, a seal is not considera-
tion in money or money's worth for tax purposes, but it nevertheless
constitutes valid consideration to uphold a written promise in some local
courts.55 In other words, the fact that the parties bargained over the
release of dower rights in the divorce court and the court took this into
account in determining the quid pro quo of each party, does not change
the nature of the consideration given. Under the tax statute the release
of dower is no more consideration in money or money's worth for the
purpose of deducting a claim from the gross estate than is the affixing
of a seal on a contract to deliver property. In the latter case even where
there has been a judgment on the contract and the judgment is claimed
as a deduction, it is still not allowed.58 From a close reading of the statute
it might be said that a judgment is no more a promise or agreement than
a decree; and being a judgment rather than a "promise or agreement,"
it does not have to be supported by consideration in money or money's
worth. Since the courts have been willing to read through the words of
the statute in the case of a "judgment", it would seem that they could
have done so in the case of a divorce "decree" without doing any more
violence to the language than had already been done.57
Not only would this suggested treatment of the statutory language be
in harmony with the legislative intention, but also it would be more in
accord with the language in other sections imposing the estate tax. Sec-
tions 811(c) and (d) both except from taxation transfers made pursuant
to "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth"; 5S and Section 811(i) adds emphasis and explanation
to these clauses. Not one of these sections limits the applicability of these
clauses to situations involving only a "promise or agreement."
53. See note 13 supra.
54. Ferguson v. Dickson, 300 Fed. 961 (3d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S.
628 (1924).
55. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.36 (1939); GRisMoRE, PRixciPLEs OF THE LAW
OF CoxTRAcTs § 87 (1947).
56. See note 99 infra and text pertaining thereto; see also Lang's Estate v.
Comm'r, 97 F.2d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1938).
57. See note 18 supra.
58. For cases interpreting this clause in these sections and holding that the release
of marital rights is not a bona fide consideration "in money or money's worth" see
Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948) ; Estate of Edwin W. Rickenberg,
11 T.C. 1 (1948); but cf. Estate of Sullivan v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.
1949).
The '32 amendment to Section 812(b), providing that the relinquish-
ment of dower and other marital rights is not consideration "in money or
money's worth", applies to the entire subchapter of the Internal Revenue
Code regulating the estate tax. In other words, this particular '32 amend-
ment applies to Sections 811(c), (d) and (i) as well as to Section 812(b).
Unless this provision is given consistent treatment throughout the estate
tax, it is not difficult to conceive of a transfer where either Section 811(c)
or (d) would require the inclusion of the property (most probably prop-
erty under a trust arrangement) in the decedent's gross estate and Sec-
tion 812(b) would allow the very same property to be deducted from
the gross estate because it happened to be transferred pursuant to a
decree rather than a "promise or agreement." Since the property would
originally be included in the gross estate because it was unsupported by a
bona fide consideration in money or money's worth, it would seem to be
inconsistent with good statutory construction to allow it to be removed from
the gross estate by a deductible claim, when the consideration upon which
that claim is founded is the same consideration which originally required
the property to be included. It is submitted, therefore, that a consistent
treatment of this entire consideration problem would not strain the statutory
language any more than the present law. The only obstacle could be
overcome by reading through the words "promise or agreement" as
previously suggested.
The law as it is presently interpreted results in these paradoxical
tax consequences in situations involving the transfer of substantially simi-
lar property under almost identical circumstances:
(1) Husband and wife separate without a property settle-
ment. On husband's death the wife's dower claim is not deduc-
tible.
(2) Husband and wife make a property settlement whereby
wife is to receive a cash payment at husband's death in con-
sideration for the release of all her dower rights. Husband and
wife are divorced and the agreement makes no mention of the
settlement. At husband's death wife's claim under the agreement
is not deductible from the husband's estate.
(3) The same as (2) except that the decree fully approves
and incorporates the settlement. At husband's death wife's claim
under the decree is deductible from the husband's estate.
The result in the following situation is uncertain:
(1) Husband and wife enter into a property settlement
whereby husband agrees to create a trust for benefit of wife in
consideration of the release of her dower rights. The divorce
decree fully approves and incorporates this agreement. Husband
creates the specified trust which by its terms reserves the power
to revoke in himself and wife. Husband dies immediately there-
after. Is the trust includible in husband's estate?
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T.E GiFT TAx
Pre-Merrill v. Fahs.-Although there had been a gift tax applicable
for the years 1924 and 1925, 59 it was considered to be of only negligible
value to the government and was therefore dropped in 1926.60 In 1932
it became evident that a gift tax should be applied to prevent the tax free
depletion of estates before death.0 1 The sections of the 1932 Act appli-
cable to the present problem have remained fundamentally unchanged to
date. 
2
The present Section 1000(a) broadly states that a tax shall be im-
posed "upon the transfer . . . of property by gift." Section 1000(b)
illustrates an intention to tax gifts regardless of their form, for it says
that the "tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
whether the gift is direct or indirect and whether the property is' real or
personal, tangible or intangible. .. ."
The other section of the gift tax which is applicable to the problem
of marriage settlements is Section 1002:
"Where property is transferred for less than adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which
the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration
shall . . be deemed a gift. .... "
Originally the Treasury took the position that all transfers, including
bona fide bad bargains, had gift tax consequences when unsupported by
full and adequate consideration.63 This view would have necessitated re-
search into all business transactions to see whether the gift tax was ap-
plicable, and the Treasury soon qualified its position by saying:
"However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made
in the ordinary course of business (a- transaction which is bona fide,
at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be con-
sidered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth .... "
From the beginning it has been made unquestionably clear by the
Regulations that the statute was intended to apply not only to gifts in
the colloquial sense, but also to transfers of property exchanged for a
consideration in money or money's worth to the extent that the value of
the property transferred by the donor exceeded the consideration given
therefor 0 5
59. Revenue Act of 1924, tit. III, pt. 11, § 319 et seq., 43 STAT. 313 (1924).
60. Revenue Act of 1926, tit. XII, § 1200, 44 STAT. 126 (1926).
61. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong, 1st Sess. (1932); reprinted 1939-1 Cum.
Bum, pt. 2, 457, 477.
62. Revenue Act of 1932, §§ 501, 503, 47 STAT. 245, 247 (1932).
63. U.S. Treas. Reg. 67, art. 1 (1924).
64. U.S. Treas. Reg. 79, art. 8 (1936).
65. Ibid.
The Regulations stated then, as they do today, that love and affection,
promise of marriage, and the like are not reducible to a money value and
therefore do not constitute consideration under the terms of the gift tax.66
Nevertheless, as late as 1940 it was thought by one authority at least
that certain incidents of marriage have a value in money or money's
worth.67 This opinion was undoubtedly based on the theory that since
some marital rights, such as inchoate dower, can be reduced to a dollar
value, they should be regarded as consideration sufficient to negate the
element of a gift up to that determined value.68  One of the reasons for
this interpretation was that a provision comparable to Section 812(b) was
not written into the gift tax; and, therefore, the omission would seem to
indicate an intention that such a provision should not apply.6 9
Comm'r v. Bristol,70 decided by the First Circuit in 1941, soon re-
jected the above theory, at least in so far as it applied to antenuptial trans-
fers. There a husband transferred property to his wife-to-be in exchange
for the release of her statutory marital rights in his property at his death.
The court, in reversing the Board of Tax Appeals, 71 held the transfer a
taxable gift on the ground that the woman's release of marital rights did
not constitute consideration within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code. The court explained its result by saying:
"To hold that the release of dower by Mrs. Bristol during her
husband's life constitutes consideration for any transfer by him to her
would in a sense defeat the purpose of the gift tax since it would
permit an untaxed transfer by gift of property which would nor-
mally be subject to the estate tax upon the husband's death."72
When the problem of postnuptial transfer came before the courts, the
treatment was different, for somewhere there seemed to be the feeling,
particularly in the Tax Court, that a property settlement in view of a
divorce should have no taxable consequences. In the leading case of
Herbert Jones 73 the Tax Court refused to agree with the Commissioner's
arguments that the only consideration for the property transferred was
the release of marital rights and that therefore the transfer should be
taxed. Instead it held that the property passing pursuant to the prop-
erty agreement, entered into prior to the divorce and not incorporated in
the divorce, was not subject to the gift tax. The approach used by the
court to reach this result is extremely important in that it should shed
light on the interpretation of subsequent decisions. First, the Tax Court
66. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.8 (1940).
67. 2 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAx HANDBOOK 1940-41, 2003 (1940).
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941).
71. Bennet B. Bristol, 42 B.T.A. 263 (1940).
72. 121 F.2d 129, 136 (1st Cir. 1941).
73. 1 T.C. 1207 (1943).
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distinguished postnuptial agreements from antenuptial agreements, the
latter having already been held taxable in the Bristol case. Next the court
placed emphasis on the fact that there was a court decree involved, citing
as an analogous authority an income tax case.7 4 The fact that there was
an existing liability to support also seemed to be a persuasive factor. And
finally, the court seemed to put a great deal of weight on the lack of any
evidence showing a donative intent in this arm's length bargain. This
test had heretofore been applied only in cases which involved a transaction
in the ordinary course of business.
Strangely enough a substantially similar problem had already arisen
in the Lasker case and the Tax Court had held that a gift tax was owed.
7 5
On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit, persuaded by the intervening
Jones decision, held that the release of marital rights under such circum-
stances was adequate and full consideration particularly since the transac-
tion involved an arm's length bargain without donative intent.78
Although it would be impossible to say that the law in this area was
crystallized by the end of 1944, nevertheless the Bristol case was the highest
authority on antenuptial contracts and the Lasker case represented the
best precedent for postnuptial agreements, whether the property settle-
ment was incorporated into the divorce decree or not.
The Merrill and Wemyss Decisions.-On March 5, 1945 the Supreme
Court handed down decisions in the companion cases of Comm'r v.
Wemyss 7 7 and Merrill v. Fahs.78 These decisions, as will be shown, went
a long way in tying the estate and gift taxes together, a correlation already
demanded of the legislature to a far greater extent than can ever be ex-
pected of the courts by judicial decision.
79
In the Wemyss case the taxpayer, pursuant to an antenuptial agree-
ment, transferred stock to his wife-to-be to reimburse her for the loss of
trust income which was payable under a trust established by her former
husband and to which she would no longer be entitled in the event of her
remarriage. The Tax Court held that a promise to marry was not sufficient
consideration measurable in money or money's worth to support the trans-
fer to the bride since the taxpayer received nothing himself, and therefore
held the transfer to be a taxable gift. s0 The Sixth Circuit reversed on
the ground that since there was no donative intent in this arm's length'
transaction, the surrender of the trust income by the wife was sufficient
74. Comm'r v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942).
75. Albert D. Lasker, 1 T.C. 208 (1942).
76. Lasker v. Comm'r, 138 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1943).
77. See note 6 supra.
78. See note 5 supra.
79. Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes, 55 HAv. L. Rtv. 1 (1941);
Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate and Gift Tax Provisions,
56 HAgv. L. REv. 337 (1942).
80. 2 T.C. 876 (1943).
consideration to take the transfer outside of the scope of the gift tax.1
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and held the transfer to
be a taxable gift. The court made it clear that donative intent was un-
necessary (unless there was first a transfer in the ordinary course of
business). The Court said common law concepts of consideration were not
controlling-more specifically, that neither a promise to marry nor a detri-
ment to the donee is a consideration reducible to a money value, and that
receipt of money or money's worth by the donor is one of the essential
tests.
The Merrill case also involved an antenuptial agreement. Pursuant
to this agreement the husband set up an irrevocable trust for wife in con-
sideration for which she released all her marital rights in his property at
his death. The District Court held the transfer to be free from tax,
8 2
but the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that when the donee released
her rights she had no rights to release, and therefore, there was no con-
sideration for the tr'ansfer.m The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
on the theory that the gift tax is supplementary to the estate tax, that the
two are therefore in pari nateria and must be construed together, and
that since the estate tax expressly states that the relinquishment of marital
rights is not consideration in money or money's worth, the relinquish-
ment of the same marital rights can not be consideration in money or
money's worth in the gift tax.
Four members of the court dissented on the grounds that since Con-
gress left a clause comparable to the last paragraph of Section 812(b)
(re the release of marital rights) out of the gift tax, the legislature intended
that these rights be accorded a different treatment under the two tax laws.
Considering this problem only from a viewpoint of statutory construction,
it is not surprising that the decision was close. However, in view of
the fact that a contrary result would have made inter vivos transfers under
an antenuptial agreement immune from both gift and estate taxes and
would have opened a wide door for tax avoidance, the number of dis-
sents is a source of wonder.8 4
As a result of these two cases it became apparent that the gift tax
was not limited to "gifts" simpliciter, that donative intent was not a factor
in determining the applicability of a transfer tax on property passing pur-
suant to marital settlements, and that the last sentence of Section 812(b)
of the estate tax was to be construed as applicable to the gift tax even
though a comparable provision was not included in the gift tax.
Post-Merrill v. Fahs.-The gift tax statute has undergone no changes
which bear on these marital transactions since the Wemyss and Merrill
cases were decided. Sections 1000 and 1002 have remained fundamentally
81. 144 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1944).
82. 51 F. Supp. 120 (1943).
83. 142 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1944).
84. PA tu, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gr TAXATION, 1946 SuPPLEM.ENT, § 16.15
(1946) ; Rudick, Marriage, Divorce and Taxes, 2 TAx L. REv, 123, 127 (1947).
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the same as they were under Sections 501 and 503 of the 1932 Revenue
Act.8 5
The government apparently was very well pleased with the favorable
construction of the gift tax in these two decisions and with reliance thereon,
in August, 1946, it released E.T. 19 which extended the rules and theories
of Wemyss and Merrill to postnuptial settlements.8 6 E.T. 19 was issued
on a request for advice concerning the application of the gift tax to trans-
fers made pursuant to an agreement of the parties incident to a proceeding
for divorce or legal separation. The Commissioner, persuaded by vari-
ous Tax Court decisions and Judge Learned Hand's views regarding sup-
port rights,8 7 stated that the surrender of support rights is not one of the
"other marital rights" referred to in the last paragraph of Section 812(b).
The theory upon which this result was based is the duty of a husband to
support a divorced wife during their lives or until she remarries.8 8 The
fulfillment of this duty or obligation, imposed by law, operates in no way
to diminish or deplete the husband's estate to any greater extent than the
payment of ordinary living expenses if the parties are still living together.
Although exempting these support rights, the Commissioner made it
unquestionably clear that, in his opinion, any transfer to a wife, whether
pursuant to an agreement or a decree, in settlement of inheritance rights
is a present transfer of what would otherwise constitute a portion of the
husband's estate at death and should be taxed as a gift the same as any
antenuptial transfer which is in settlement of inheritance rights. The
question whether a transfer is in excess of reasonable support rights is
left for the determination of the Bureau, but in so far as the Bureau finds
any portion of a transfer allocable to release by the wife of her dower
or other marital rights, that portion would not be considered by the Com-
missioner to have been made to any extent for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth. 9
Without a doubt the Merrill case cleared up the problem of transfers
pursuant to antenuptial agreements based on the release of marital rights.
However, in the first case involving a postnuptial settlement to come be-
fore the Tax Court after Merrill v. Fahs, it was held that the transfer made
in connection with an absolute divorce was tax free.90 The majority in
this case, Edmund C. Converse,91 and the similar case of Matthew
Lahti,9 2 distinguished the Merrill case on the grounds that the latter in-
volved an antenuptial agreement whereas the former both involved post-
nuptial transactions in which the settlements were arrived at without
85. See note 62 supra.
86. See note 40 supra.
87. Meyer's Estate v. Comm'r, 110 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1940).
88. 1946-2 Cum. BuT.. 166, 168.
89. Id. at 169.
90. Edmund C. Converse, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945).
91. Ibid.
92. 6 T.C. 7 (1946).
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donative intent and only after a bona fide arm's length bargain (citing the
Jones case).93 In both the Converse and Lahti cases there were strong
dissents by three members of the court based on the theory that the doc-
trine of the Jones case had been repudiated by the Wemyss and Merrill
cases and that there existed no basis for a distinction between antenuptial
and postnuptial transfers.
Although the Converse and Lahti cases were decided by the Tax Court
before E.T. 19 was promulgated, the Tax Court considered them as bind-
ing precedent. This was particularly true after the Converse case was
affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,94 without any distinc-
tion being made between the portion of the property transferred in con-
sideration of the release of support rights and the portion of the property
transferred in consideration of the release of marital rights. All of these
decisions, while not without dissent, consistently held these postnuptial
transfers nontaxable. The majority of the Court generally placed em-
phasis on the factors that (1) the transfer was without donative intent,
(2) the settlement was reached only after an arm's length bargain, (3)
the transfer was made pursuant to a court decree, and (4) the transfers
involved presently enforceable claims against the transferor. The authori-
ties most often cited to substantiate the opinions were the Jones and Lasker
cases. In the case of Edward B. McClean 95 the Tax Court even went so
far as to say:
"For reasons not clear to us, E.T. 19 excepts support and main-
tenance from marital rights the release of which does not constitute
full and adequate consideration. We deem the ruling invalid in so far
as it does not also except transfers made to settle presently enforce-
able claims." 96
An interesting sidelight into the Tax Court's confusing reasoning in
these cases is found in the cases of Roland M. Hooker 97 and Albert V.
Moore 98 decided the same day in 1948. In the Hooker case there was a
trust which was to be set up in favor of a minor child in accordance with a
separation agreement which had been "ratified, adopted, and approved"
by the divorcee decree. Although the trust was for the "maintenance and
support" of the child, the taxpayer refused to make the transfer into trust
until compelled to do so by a decree of specific performance. The Com-
missioner contended that the amount transferred over and above the obli-
gation of support was a taxable gift. The taxpayer argued that since the
property was transferred pursuant to a divorce court's decree as in the
93. See text at note 73 .rnpra.
94. 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947).
95. 11 T.C. 543 (1948).
96. Id. at 549.
97. 10 T.C. 388 (1948).
98. 10 T.C. 393 (1948).
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Converse case, it was without taxable consequences. The Tax Court
agreed with the Commissioner and held the transfer taxable on the theory
that the transfer was made pursuant to an agreement which was without
consideration in money or money's worth and -which was not an arm's
length transaction made in the ordinary course of business without donative
intent. The court said that the absence of donative intent may not be
presumed in antenuptial agreements and in transfers for the benefit of
minor children. Dicta in this opinion show a penetrating insight into all
these problems:
"Courts, asked to enforce contracts, do not inquire into the ade-
quacy of consideration in cases, such as this, involving no fraud of
any kind, but enforce agreements supported by any valid tonsideration.
Congress legislates in the light of existing law. It may not be sup-
posed that it intended to pass a law which could be circumvented by
the clever process of entering into an agreement to make a transfer,
supported by an inadequate money consideration, and then making
the transfer to satisfy a judgment on the agreement." 01
In the Moore case the husband and wife entered into a separation
agreement wherein the wife released all support rights and $12,500 of
her right to share in husband's estate at his death and in exchange the
husband transferred certain property to her. The divorce court in Nevada
"ratified and confifmed" the agreement. The Tax Court held that the
transfer made pursuant to this decree was tax free upon the authority of
Jones, Lahti, and Converse. It disregarded completely the argument made
by the Commissioner that since some of the property was transferred for
less than an adequate and full consideration under Section 1002 as in-
terpreted in Merrill v. Fahs, the gift tax was applicable to that portion of
the transfer. 0 0
In the Hooker case the court looked through the divorce court's de-
cree to the adequacy of the consideration. In the Moore case the court
refused to search behind the same kind of a decree. If any conclusions
can be drawn from these Tax Court decisions, they must be that a post-
nuptial settlement between a husband and wife will not involve any tax-
able transfers provided some sort of a divorce decree recogniied the prop-
erty settlement, and a postnuptial transfer to a minor child will be taxed
in so far as the value of the property transferred exceeds the value the
Commissioner feels is necessary for support, regardless of whether the
transfer is ordered by a decree or a judgment or both.
While the Tax Court, blithely ignoring the statutory language, was
consistently holding that a transfer between husband and wife pursuant to
a postnuptial settlement resulted in no taxable gift, the Second Circuit
99. 10 T.C. 388, 392 (1948).
100. 10 T.C. 393, 397 (1948).
NOTES
was reaching inconsistent results taxwise, in the endeavor to read the
statute consistently.
In its first case, Comm'r v. Converse,' which involved a divorce
decree ordering an agreed lump-sum payment of alimony (the wife releas-
ing all claim to support and all claims to marital rights in her husband's
property), the Second Circuit held the transfer free from tax. The prin-
cipal reason for this decision was the complementary nature of the estate
and gift taxes. Since, under the authority, of the Maresi case, a claim
based on a court decree would be deductible from the husband's estate if
he died before paying it,102 an inter vivos payment of the same claim
should not be taxed as a gift. The court refused to put any weight on the
Tax Court's distinction between postnuptial and antenuptial agreements,
and held only that a transfer which would discharge a deductible claim at
death would not be taxed as a gift.
The second case to come before the Second Circuit was the case of
Comnn'r v. Barnard's Estate.10 3 There the wife made a transfer to her
husband pursuant to a postnuptial agreement wherein husband released
all claims he had on her property. Wife paid her husband, and later the
agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree. The court, in holding
the transfer taxable, based its decision on the fact that the payment was
pursuant to the agreement and not the decree, even though the decree
incidentally ratified the executed agreement. By way of dicta the court
not only overruled the Jones case, but also said that the Tax Court's dis-
tinction between antenuptial and postnuptial agreements was invalid. The
latter conclusion was based on the theory that since the amount that Mrs.
Merrill would have received at Merrill's death would have been taxed
before she received it, and the amount Mr. Barnard would have received
at Mrs. Barnard's death by marital right would have been taxed before
he received it, there was no logical ground for the distinction. If the gift
tax were not applied to transfers to a spouse in consideration of the re-
lease of his or her marital rights, a gap would be present through which
the estate tax could be successfully avoided.
The most recent case to be decided by the Second Circuit is the
Harris case.'0 4 Here, too, there was a postnuptial transfer from wife to
husband in exchange for the release of his marital rights. The transfer
was pursuant to an agreement which by its terms was to survive any
divorce decree, but which was, nevertheless, incorporated into the divorce
decree by a court which by statute was directed to make a property settle-
ment. The court, placing much emphasis on the terms of the agreement,
held that the transfer was a taxable gift. Under the applicable local law
the agreement would survive the decree and be binding even if the decree
101. See note 94 mtpra.
102. See note 43 mipra.
103. 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949).
104. 178 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1949).
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were changed; therefore, the court felt that it could properly hold that the
transfer was pursuant to the agreement as well as the decree. Since the
agreement was supported only by husband's release of marital rights, an
inadequate consideration in money or money's worth, the gift tax was
held to apply to the transfer.
Both the Barnard and Harris cases put sharp limitations on the
Converse case. In fact, it was even questioned whether or not the test
laid down by the Converse case was overruled by the Harris decision.105
In jurisdictions where the agreements were held to survive the divorce
decree, parties could expect the gift tax to apply to every transfer where
the only consideration was the relinquishment of marital rights. Property
settlements in such jurisdictions could be tax-free after this decision only
where the transfers were pursuant to an obligation imposed solely by a
decree.
In the meantime the Fifth Circuit had affirmed the Tax Court's de-
cision on the Hooker case 106 and the District Court of West Virginia
in Krause v. Yoke' 0 7 had held taxable a transfer made pursuant to an
agreement incorporated into a divorce decree. In both cases the deciding
court looked through the divorce court's decree to the original agreement
and, finding it unsupported by an adequate consideration for tax purposes,
held that a tax was owed. Although these decisions do not help to deter-
mine the taxability of transfers made solely pursuant to a decree, they do
reach sensible results by taxing transfers which were unsupported by the
requisite consideration in money or money's worth, regardless of the
presence of a court decree.
The Supreme Court and the Harris Case.'0 8 -When the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the Harris case it was hoped that all the prob-
lems surrounding postnuptial transfers would be clarified as clearly as
the Merrill case had clarified the law in regard to antenuptial transfers. 0 9
As in the Merrill case, the final decision was by a five to four majority, but
the reasons for the split are far from being as clear as they were in that
case.
In this case the husband and wife were unscrambling their varied
and substantial property interests. This included the settling of various
litigated claims to separate property, the arrangement and assumption of
many obligations, and the division of considerable property. The value
of the property passing to the husband from the wife exceeded the value
of the property passing in the other direction. According to the Com-
missioner, the difference between these two values was supported only
by the husband's release of his marital rights and was therefore subject
105. See Comment, 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 659, 661 (1950).
106. 174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949).
107. 89 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. W. Va. 1950).
108. See note 1 supra.
109. See note 105 supra.
to the gift tax. The agreement provided that it was to be submitted to
the court for its approval and that it was in no sense to be binding on the
parties unless a decree of absolute divorce was entered. The agreement
further provided that "the covenants in this agreement shall survive any
decree of divorce which may be entered". The decree entered by the
court stated: "It is ordered that said agreement . . . shall survive the
decree."
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority of the Court, held the
transfer free from tax on the grounds that since the Nevada law-under
which the divorce was granted-instructed the divorce court to decree a
just and equitable disposition of all property, it was the decree, not the
agreement submitted to the court, which fixed the rights and obligations
of the parties. Also the fact that the agreement was wholly conditional
upon the entry of the decree seemed persuasive to the majority of the
Court. This was the theory of the Maresi case and the court approved it
as sound.
Having determined that it was a decree and not a "promise or agree-
ment" which determined the rights and duties of the parties, the Court said
that the test of adequate and full consideration was no longer applicable
unless an element of donative intent could be shown. The Court analogized
the unscrambling of property interests between a husband and wife to
the dissolution of a partnership firm. Althougfi it conceded that the post-
marriage situation was not "in the ordinary course of business" in any
conventional sense, it could see no reason why the rules applicable to the
dissolution of a partnership should not be applied, at least in the absence of
a statute which brought all marital property settlements under the gift tax.
The Court explained that where the transfer of marital rights is
effected by the parties, it is pursuant to a promise or agreement and is a
taxable transfer; that where the transfer is effected by a court decree no
promise or agreement of the parties is involved; and that in the latter case,
the test of consideration in money or money's worth is replaced by the test
of a bona fide transaction, at arm's length, and free from donative intent.
These rules are easy to apply once it has been decided just which instru-
ment creates the obligation. The Supreme Court's decision, however, did
not solve this major problem, for it laid down no rules to aid in the deter-
mination of the moving factor, i.e., under what circumstances the transfer
is affected by a court decree. Accordingly, it appears that the problem
whether the property passes pursuant to a decree or pursuant to an agree-
ment faces the taxpayer in a gift tax return as much as in an estate tax
return. The Court's acceptance of the Maresi case makes this doubly
apparent. The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter asked, in
essence, for an affirmance of Judge Learned Hand's decision in the Second
Circuit." 0
110. 71 Sup. Ct. 181, 185 (1950).
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The spirit behind the majority opinion would go so far as to hold tax
free any transfer made pursuant to a divorce decree just so long as the
agreement was in some way incorporated in the decree and evidenced an
arm's length transaction without donative intent. This impression comes
from the Court's refusal to look through the decree to the agreement in a
case which was easily subject to such treatment, as well as from its refusal
to distinguish further the plain meaning difference between "promise or
agreement" and decree, by saying that if any "more legalistic lines are to
be drawn, Congress must do it." :" Athough the result reached is in
complete accord with the pari materia theory of the estate and gift taxes,
it is difficult to see how the present decision can possibly help clear up the
cloud of confusion which exists because of the many and varied ways of
incorporating an agreement into a divorce decree. Perhaps it can be so
broadly interpreted as to hold tax free any and all postmarital agreements
which are incorporated into a divorce decree, regardless of the degree of
incorporation.
Recent developnents.-Whether the above suggested treatment will
be followed by the lower courts is open to grave doubts. In the first deci-
sion to be rendered by the Tax Court on this problem since the Harris
case, that court held taxable a transfer made pursuant to an agreement
which was adopted and approved by the divorce decree. 11 2 The Tax Court
stated that where by the terms of the property settlement agreement its
operation is conditioned in any manner upon the entry of a divorce decree,
then the decree and not the agreement creates and fixes the rights and
obligations of the parties. Having so stated the rule of the Harris case,
the court went on and attempted to distinguish the Harris case on the
grounds that the effectiveness of the agreement in the case before it was
in no way dependent upon the entry of a divorce decree.
In both cases by the terms of the agreements the covenants therein were
to remain in full force and effect after a judgment or decree of divorce,
regardless of whether or not the decree embodied the terms of the agree-
ment. Also both divorce decrees were granted by Nevada courts, which
were directed by statute to decree an equitable disposition of the property
of the parties. 1 3 In each instance the parties contemplated and expected
111. Id. at 184.
112. George G. McMurtry, 16 T.C.-, No. 23 (1951). The decision in this case
was probably greatly influenced by the fact that the transferor had made two almost
identical transfers, pursuant to property settlements, to the wives of his two un-
successful marriage ventures. Transfer to divorced wife number one was in no
way incorporated in the divorce decree, whereas transfer to divorced wife number
two was "ratified and approved" by the decree. Faced with the paradox of holding
the first transfer taxable and the second transfer tax free (assuming a reasonably
broad interpretation of the Harris decision), the Tax Court probably searched high
and low to find some distinguishing features upon which it could base a tax imposi-
tion on the second transfer also. The factor selected was the failure of the agree-
ment in the instant case to condition its validity upon the entrance of a final divorce
decree. Thus the paradox was avoided for the moment.
113. NiEv. Comp. LAWS § 9463. This law has since been amended, applying now
only to community property.
an absolute divorce decree to be granted. It therefore appears to border
on the ridiculous to hold on the one hand that where one divorcing couple
conditions their agreement upon the entry of a divorce decree, there are no
gift tax consequences; and, on the other hand, to hold that where another
divorcing couple fail to mention the anticipated divorce decree there are
gift tax ramifications. Although the rule as stated by the Tax Court is
found in the Harris opinion,"14 it seems inconceivable that it was intended
to be the sole test for determining when the agreement was fully incor-
porated in the decree.
Apparently then it is not enough, so far as the Tax Court is now
concerned, to have the agreement incorporated by the decree. There must
be more. The agreement must not only be incorporated into the decree by
ratification and approval, but also by its terms the agreement must state
that it is not to be effective until a divorce decree has been entered. This
treatment is in marked contrast to the Tax Court's previous approach to
postnuptial agreements, and is especially surprising when it is realized that
the language of the Supreme Court in the Harris case offered a golden
opportunity to apply the "at arm's length without donative intent" test it
had already been applying in these situations.
For those planning property settlements it would probably be wise
to condition specifically the effectiveness of the settlement upon the entry
of an absolute divorce decree and ask the court to incorporate the agree-
ment -into the decree. If these two requirements are met and there is an
absence of any collusion or donative intent, it would seem that both the
Tax Court and the Supreme Court would agree that there are no tax con-
sequences. Once it has been established that the decree is the operative
factor, it does not matter whether some of the consideration for the trans-
fer is the release of marital rights or not.
CONCLUSIONS
Property Rights after a Separation or Divorce.-Much of the con-
fusion in this area is attributable to a lack of proper understanding of the
rights of the parties after a separation or divorce. These rights are con-
trolled by such a variety of statutes in the various states that it would be
difficult and of little benefit to undertake any detailed analysis of the sub-
ject. However, there are general concepts which run through all the
statutes and which should be of some aid in comprehending the theory be-
hind these property rights, especially as it is related to the gift and estate
taxes.
At early common law the property rights which were acquired solely
by virtue of the marriage, i.e., dower and curtesy, perished when the mar-
riage was terminated by an absolute divorce." 5 Today many states have
either codified this rule or applied it as part of their own common law.
114. 71 Sup. Ct. 181, 183 (1950).
115. 2 VxurERm, Am mcAN FAmILy LA-ws § 96 (1932); WARuEN, ScaoulER
DrvoRzc MANUAL § 193(c) (1944).
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There are many other states, however, which vary this common law rule.
In some of the latter group of states the wife, on an absolute divorce, is
entitled to a dower interest in the husband's property, to be recovered and
assigied to her as though he were dead."" In some the wife retains her
dower rights but cannot collect them until her husband dies." 7  Under
other statutes the court is required to make a provision in lieu of dower in
the divorce decree."18 In some instances the right to this property is de-
termined by the guilt or innocence of the party claiming the right.119 And
in still others the determination of the property rights of the various parties
is left to the discretion of the court.
20
Usually a limited divorce or legal separation, as it is sometimes called,
merely separates the persons of the spouses, destroying the right of co-
habitation but not otherwise affecting the existence of the marriage.121
Since the marriage continues after the decree, so also do the marital rights
such as dower and curtesy.'2 2  If one spouse dies after a limited divorce
the other is usually entitled to the same share of the deceased's estate as
she or he would have been entitled to had no decree of separation been
entered.'2- Naturally, the same holds true if the parties themselves by
private agreement consent to separation.
Since alimony is, in a strict sense, an enforcement of the husband's
obligation to support his wife,124 it would seem that no such obligation
could exist after an absolute divorce. However, in almost every American
jurisdiction there is some sort of statute authorizing the court to provide
for the support of the wife in divorce actions.' 2 5  These support rights
are to be carefully distinguished from the marital property rights, for
under E.T. 19 the release of support rights is a valuable consideration in
money or money's worth, whereas the release of "other marital rights"
is not.
Application of the Theory of Section 811(b) to Separation or Di-
vorce.-Since it is the purpose of Section 811(b) to include in the de-
ceased's gross estate that property which passes to the surviving spouse
by virtue of his or her marital rights in the property, 2 6 it seems only
logical that the property which passes to such spouse by virtue of the
marital right should be included in the gross estate whether the parties are
husband and wife at the time of the death or not. Promises supported by
116. WARREN, op. cit. supra note 115, §352; see also VERNIER, op. cit SUpra
note 115, §§ 99, 100.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.; see also 27 C.J.S., Divorce § 296 (1941).
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 115, § 127.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. VERNmR, op. cit. supra note 115, § 104.
125. Ibid.
126. See note 10 mipra and text pertaining thereto.
the release of dower and other marital rights are not deductible claims
under Section 812(b) because any property transferred by these rights is
specifically included in the gross estate under Section 811(b) .127 Since
this is true, it seems pure folly to allow any claim based on the release
of these marital rights to be deducted under Section 812(b). This is the
all-inclusive purpose of the last paragraph of Section 812(b).128
As shown above, divorce decrees may or may not involve the deter-
mination of property rights. If they do involve these marital rights, it
seems only reasonable that these transactions should be treated taxwise in
the same manner as ordinary transfers between spouses. Suppose, for
example, the divorce decree orders the wife's dower right to continue until
husband dies. At husband's death this property should, in the first in-
stance, be included in his gross estate, and it should not thereafter be
deductible from his gross estate by virtue of the fact that the wife's claim
to this property is based on a court decree. This court decree is based
upon the marriage right of dower and the property to be transferred to her
is the same property she would receive if the marriage were still in effect
at the time of her husband's death. The mere fact that the dower property
now passes to a "divorced" wife rather than to a "married" wife does not
justify any different tax treatment. Suppose further that the divorced
wife in exchange for cash releases this claim imposed upon her husband
by the above decree. This release should not be Any more "consideration"
for an inter vivos transfer than the release of dower rights by a married
wife.12 9 Surely, it must be clear that it is the same property in each case,
whether the parties are married or divorced, and in each case if the trans-
fer is permitted to pass tax free it operates to diminish the decedent's gross
estate without any tax consequences.
In states where the divorce court decrees that the wife is entitled to a
dower interest in her husband's estate as though he were dead, the situation
is the same as the inter vivos release in the previous hypothetical. The
wife is receiving property out of husband's gross estate which she would
otherwise receive only at his death and only after the estate tax had been
applied thereto. Since this decree operates to remove property from hus-
band's gross estate, which property would otherwise be included in his
gross estate at death by virtue of Section 811(b), it seems logical that it
should be subject to the gift tax at the time of the transfer. °30 The same
reasoning holds true where the divorce court decrees property to be trans-
ferred in lieu of dower. In fact, any transfer of property between husband
and wife because of a divorce decree, which transfer has as its basis the
release of marital rights, should be subject to either the gift or the estate
tax.
127. See note 18 supra and text pertaining thereto.
128. Ibid.
129. See notes 22 and 24 supra and text pertaining thereto.
130. Since one of the purposes of the Gift Tax is to supplement the Estate
Tax, any tax free inter vivos transfer of this property would defeat this purpose.
See note 6 supra and text pertaining thereto.
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In jurisdictions where a spouse has no marital property rights after
the divorce, there are no reasons whatsoever for transfers of property over
and above the value of support rights except where the transferor is being
punished for being the guilty party 131 or where that party is virtually
"buying the divorce." 132 In the first instance, neither the gift nor the
estate tax should apply, for this penalty payment is so analogous to a tort
damage payment which has no transfer tax ramifications, that it too should
have no tax consequences. The second case, however, is analogous to the
release of marital rights, and under no circumstances should it be con-
sidered that the "buying" party is getting in exchange an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, no matter how happy it may
make him or her to be free from the marriage. In this latter case the
divorce decree comes so close to being a consent decree that it should be
scrutinized very carefully for tax ramifications.
This tax theory should be followed in all the postnuptial cases, separa-
tion and divorce, whether the transfer is pursuant to a decree or an agree-
ment. It is the quid pro quo of the property transferred that should be
the focal point, not the "decree" or the "agreement." If the property is
transferred in exchange for the release of rights to share in the other's
estate at death, there should be tax consequences. Any other result would
amount to a tax free removal from the transferor's estate of property that
would otherwise be included in his gross estate. If the property is trans-
ferred in exchange for an acceptance of the divorce, there should also be
tax consequences, since the acceptance of the divorce is not reducible to a
consideration in money or money's worth. In reality this situation is the
same as the previous one, for one spouse is merely agieeing to aid in the
procurement of the divorce in exchange for some of the property he or she
would be entitled to at the other's death had the marriage continued.
Finally, if the property is transferred in exchange for the release of sup-
port rights, no tax consequences should follow, because the transferor's
gross estate is not being diminished to any greater extent than it would
have been had the parties continued to live as husband and wife.
133
Had this theory been applied to the Harris case, the result would
have been different, for there the wife was actually "buying" the divorce. 3 4
131. VtRIER, op. cit. supra note 115, § 96.
132. In some instances one party is so anxious to obtain the divorce that he is
willing to pay the other party to help attain this goal. In other instances a divorce
must be contested in order to release real property in another jurisdiction from
claims based on marital rights, and therefore it is to the advantage of the property
holder to have the divorce contested. Quite often the price for this freedom is
expensive. See Conm'r v. Barnard's Estate, 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949), discussed
in the text at note 103 supra. In still other cases the price paid goes to the other
party for not c6ntesting the divorce. In these cases there are usually grounds for
not granting the divorce and therefore the payment is made for the silence of the
other party. These and similar circumstances represent instances where divorces
are "bought", e.g., where one spouse, desiring complete freedom, is willing to pay
money for the release of all rights and obligations arising out of the marriage.
133. This is the theory behind E. T. 19, supra note 86.
134. Brief for Respondent, pp. 40, 41, 42, Harris v. Comm'r, 71 Sup. Ct. 181
(1950).
The wife, desiring to be free from her husband and questioning the effect
of an uncontested divorce on his rights to her property at her death, in
reality paid him for the release of all his marital rights and for his par-
ticipation in the divorce. The transfer clearly operated to remove from
wife's estate property which otherwise would have been included in her
gross estate at death and therefore should have been subject to a gift tax.
It is to be emphasized that this analysis only attempts to apply the
theory of Section 811(b) to postnuptial transfers, pursuant to either a
decree or an agreement, as it has already been applied to antenuptial
transfers. It does not attempt to square this theory with the language of
Section 812(b), for, as it has already been conceded, the results already
reached by the courts do have some foundation in the language of the
statute. Although the courts originally could have adapted this analysis
to the wording of the statute, now that the law has settled on a different
interpretation, any further changes will have to be made by Congress.
Marital Deductions.-The Revenue Act of 1948 added a marital de-
duction section to the estate tax.18 5 In essence this section provides that
an amount equal to the value of property which is included in the de-
cedent's gross estate and which is to pass to his surviving spouse is deduc-
tible from the decedent's adjusted gross estate, up to fifty per cent of that
adjusted gross estate. The effect of this deduction on the postmarital situa-
tion is important if just and equitablt results are to be reached.
Nowhere in the Code or in the Regulations is the term "surviving
spouse" defined. In the absence of such definition, it seems only reason-
able that the applicable state law be determinative. 3 6  Even though a
decree of legal separation or limited divorce may have been entered, the
husband and wife usually retain the property rights of the marriage,
and the survivor is usually regarded as the surviving spouse.13 7 An abso-
lute divorce, on the other hand, severs the marriage relationship com-
pletely, and the parties are no longer husband and wife.13 8
As a result, it appears that at the death of the husband in the ordinary
marriage situation, a marital deduction is allowed for property passing to
135. INT. REv. CODE § 812(e).
136. The only authoritative declaration which could be found bearing on this point
was in the committee reports. SEN. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted 194.8-1 Cum. BULL pt. 1, 335:
"The status of an individual as the decedent's surviving spouse is determined
at the time of .the decedent's death. A legal separation which has not (at the
time of the decedent's death) terminated the marriage does not affect such status
for the purposes of section 812(e) (1). A transfer by the decedent during his
lifetime to an individual to whom he was not married at the time of the transfer
but to whom he is married at the time of his death and who survives him is a
transfer by the decedent to his surviving spouse. If an interest in property
passes from the decedent to a person who was his spouse but is not married to
him at the time of his death, the interest is not considered as passing to the de-
cedent's surviving spouse even though such person survives the decedent."
The same rule apparently holds true with respect to the Gift Tax. 1948-1 Cum.
BuLL. Part 1, 351, 352.
137. See note 121, supra and text pertaining thereto.
138. See note 115 supra and text pertaining thereto.
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the surviving wife whether it passes by virtue of the decedent's will or by
virtue of the wife's claim of dower against her deceased husband's estate.
The same is true when the couple are legally separated. However, it seems
that where a divorced wife takes property, either under her husband's
will or by virtue of an agreement providing for property to pass to her in
lieu of dower, no deduction will be allowable, for the divorced wife will
not be a "surviving spouse." Since, as it has been shown, 13 9 a divorced
wife is quite often entitled to either dower in her husband's estate or to a
transfer in lieu of dower, it seems inequitable not to allow a marital deduc-
tion in this case. It is the same property which passes to the wife whether
she is legally separated or absolutely divorced. There seems to be no
reason why the property should not be subject to the marital deduction in
both cases, regardless of the legal status of the parties.140  In the case
where a divorced spouse marries again, this approach may mean that
for estate tax purposes there may be two or more "surviving spouses";
but this should not result in any unsurmountable problems, so long as the
total marital deduction is limited to fifty per cent of the adjusted gross
estate.
Under the present law:
(1) If a "married" man dies and his wife claims dower
from his estate, there is an allowable marital deduction from his
adjusted gross estate for the property passing to her.141
(2) If a "separated" husband dies and his wife claims dower
there is an allowable marital deduction from his adjusted gross
estate for the property passing to her.
1 42
(3) If a "divorced" husband dies and his ex-wife claims
dower under a court decree, there is an allowable claim deduction
from his gross estate.'
43
(4) If a "divorced" husband dies and his ex-wife claims
dower under an agreement not made a part of the divorce decree,
there is no deduction allowed whatsoever.
1 4 4
Even though the property passing to the wife may be the same in
each instance, and even though her claim to this property is in each in-
stance based on the marriage relationship (whether it is still in existence
or not), the results are different. It is submitted that there is no basis in
fact or theory for this discrepancy.
139. See text pertaining to notes 115 through 120 mtpra.
140. Whether the parties be divorced or married the right to the property is
still founded on the marriage.
141. See note 135 .ipra.
142. Ibid.
143. See text at note 42 supra, and paragraph immediately preceding.
144. Ibid.
Despite the variety of state statutes, they fit a basic pattern so that a
surviving spouse or ex-spouse who receives property other than that trace-
able to support rights or quasi-tort damages,'145 is receiving property by
virtue of "dower, curtesy . . . or other marital rights." This transfer
should be subject to tax under the theory of Section 811(b). As long
as the basic quid pro quo of the transfer is the release of marital rights,
the tax consequences should not vary in the slightest, whether the prop-
erty is transferred pursuant to common law, statutory law, a court decree,
or an agreement.
In so far as the gift tax is concerned, the original theory should apply,
that where the transfer operates to remove from the transferor's estate
property that would normally be included in his gross estate at death,
that transfer should be subject to tax. The marital deduction of the gift
tax as it now stands under the '48 Act,1 46 should be made to coincide with
the suggested marital deduction of the estate tax. In other words, the
regular provisions of the marital deduction of the gift tax should be appli-
cable to any transfer to an ex-spouse wherein he or she receives property
by virtue of the previous marital relationship. This would mean that
only where a postnuptial transfer was in settlement of marital rights would
the marital deduction of the gift tax apply. Such a provision would operate
equally for all taxpayers whether or not they had the benefit of astute coun-
sel and had made the transfer before the final decree in order to take
advantage of this marital deduction. 14 7  The reasonableness of this pro-
posed change can be best illustrated by showing that in all other cases, e.g.,
ordinary marriage and legal separation, the transferor would be entitled to a
marital deduction for a transfer in exchange for the release of marital
rights. There is no reason why the same tax consequences should not
apply to all transfers to a spouse or ex-spouse qua spouse. Once the
marital right have been completely released, any subsequent transfers to
the ex-spouse should be treated by the same rules applicable to transfers to
any third party. There are then no property ties between the parties
which arise out of the marital status, and they are, thereafter, in all re-
spects, two separate individuals with no mutual rights or duties.
Proposals.-First of all, it is submitted that any distinction between
transfers pursuant to an agreement and tranfers pursuant to a decree, where
the only consideration passing to the transferor is the release of marital
rights, has no basis in fact or in legislative intent. Since this distinction
145. The phrase "quasi-tort damages" refers to the penalty mentioned in the
text at note 131 supra.
146. INT. REV. CODE § 1004(a) (3).
147. There would be no need for this advice if the present law regarding the
deductibility of transfers pursuant to divorce decrees remains in operation; under
present conditions able counsel would surely arrange that the transfer was pursuant
to a divorce decree so that the entire amount would be deductible instead of just
half. Assuming, however, that this unfounded distinction between decrees and agree-
ments is removed, then the suggestion regarding the time of transfer would be ap-
plicable.
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has arisen because of an unintended construction of Section 812(b), it is
proposed that this section be changed so as to make it unequivocally clear
what tax consequences should follow. Section 812(b) should be revised
so as to provide that any claim based upon a tort or a quasi-tort obliga-
tion be deductible without meeting the consideration "in money or money's
worth" requirement. All other claims, whether based upon court decrees
or judgments should be deductible only to the extent that they are sup-
ported by an adequate consideration in money or money's worth as defined
by the Act, especially the last paragraph of Section 812(b).
It should also be expressly provided that inter vivos transfers meet
similar consideration requirements in order to be tax-free.
The marital deduction sections should be reworded so as to include
certain transfers to ex-spouses. In the estate tax area, it is suggested that
any property passing to a surviving spouse or any surviving ex-spouse come
under the cope of the marital deduction. The limit of the deduction should
still be fifty per cent of the adjusted gross estate, regardless of whether
there be one or twenty qualified transferees. 148
The marital deduction of the gift tax should also be revised so as to
provide for a consistent treatment of all inter vivos transfers for which the
only consideration is the release of marital rights. The marital deduction
of Section 1004(a) (3) should be made to apply to transfers to an ex-
spouse of the transferor only where the consideration for the transfer is
the release of the ex-spouse's marital rights in the transferor's property.
Under the present law, the taxability or nontaxability of postnuptial
transfers depends for the most part on ad hoc determinations by the courts
of the question whether the property is passing pursuant to an agreement or
pursuant to a decree. There is no justification for this distinction in either
the theory of the tax, the intent of the legislature, or the quid pro quo of
the property being transferred. Legislative clarification of the present con-
fused state of the law is obviously desirable. The proposals submitted
could help achieve more consistent and more equitable results.
George J. Hauptfuhrer, Jr.
148. Although it is true that in divorce cases where the wife remarries, the second
husband may get some of the first husband's estate tax free if he survives the wife;
nevertheless, this is true in an ordinary marriage where the surviving wife remarries.
If any changes should be made to eliminate this second tax free transfer, they should
be made to apply to both situations similarly.
